DEPORTATIONS, REMOVALS AND THE 1996 IMMIGRATION ACTS:
A MODERN LOOK AT THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
*
by Lupe S. Salinas
“There are those that look at things the way they are, and ask why? I dream of things that
**
never were, and ask why not.”--Robert F. Kennedy
I.

Introduction
1

The United States Supreme Court should extend the Ex Post Facto Clause to conviction2

related deportation/removal proceedings.

In many respects, deportation can be viewed as a

punishment that is more severe than confinement since removal from home, family, and country can
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1
U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl.3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”) &
Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . .”).
2
The power for the Supreme Court to undertake judicial review was established quite early in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (Chief Justice Marshall announced the
concept of judicial review, stating that a statute in conflict with the Constitution is repugnant to
the fundamental law and therefore void ).

3

4

mean permanent exile, in some cases to a country the deportee may have never actually known.

As to the effects of deportation, Justice Brandeis stated in 1919: “To deport one who so claims to
be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty. . . .

It may result also in loss of both property and

life; or of all that makes life worth living. Against the danger of such deprivation, without the
sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of
5

due process of law.” That same due process protection is similarly afforded by our Constitution to
6

permanent resident aliens.

Our famous Constitution has room to grow, to develop into a document that is consistent in
7

all respects. The Fourth Amendment refers to freedom from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Yet hundreds of American residents entered the new millennium in immigration custody, facing
banishment from the United States and detachment from their families. Permanent resident aliens
across America committed crimes and served their sentences well before the effective date of the
extremely castigating 1996 legislation of the Newt Gingrich-inspired so-called “Contract With
America.” As a result of these extreme legislative actions, the INS and civil rights groups have
urged Congress to enact legislation to restore discretion in federal judges in deportation matters and
8

to provide immigrants with due process protections.

The United States Supreme Court, in its service as the third branch of government,

3

William R. Maynard, An Immigration Law Primer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, VOICE 27
(April 1999) [hereinafter Maynard].
4
E.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (deported alien had been in the United States since
the age of three). Removing criminals from our nation serves a valid purpose; however, removal
regardless of the equities involved seems arbitrary, particularly considering that American
immigration policy places a high priority on family reunification in admissions. J. Joseph Reina,
Understanding Family-Based Immigration, State Bar of Texas 2003 Immigration Law Course,
Ch. 5.1 (2003).
5
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922).
6
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8
Steve Lash, Deportation power changes are pushed, HOUS. CHRON., July 29, 1999, at A9.

interpreted part of the congressional legislation and ruled during the 2000 term that, absent clear
9

contrary congressional directive, aliens have a right to a federal court habeas corpus hearing.

In

addition, the Court concluded that an alien retained certain statutory privileges under the
immigration laws since nothing in the 1996 immigration legislation indicated that the repeal of the
10

privilege of discretionary relief from deportation applied retroactively.
11

ruled in Stogner v. California

More recently, the Court

that certain enactments violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto

Clause. The writer will establish that Stogner strongly supports voiding the retroactive applications
of the aggravated felony concept of the 1996 Immigration Acts.
Court rulings that deportation is a civil proceeding, and thus not impacted by the Ex Post
Facto Clause, reminded the writer of a conflict he experienced in 1975 when he served as a rookie
prosecutor in the Harris County District Attorney’s Office in Houston, Texas. As a juvenile court
prosecutor, the writer’s duties included the termination of parental rights in cases involving child
12

abuse. Texas procedural law classifies a parental termination proceeding as civil in nature.

However, the result could punish the accused mother and/or father who brought the youth into the
world by removing the child from his parent’s custody and supervision. Thus, in many respects, a
termination of parental rights penalizes a parent worse than depriving them of their liberty. The
consequence is magnified if the termination of their rights occurred under circumstances that raise
serious due process questions, such as not having an attorney to defend them because of their
13

indigent status.
9

See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 (2001); see U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9 (2) (“The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
10
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); see Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) and Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
11
539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
12
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 308a (1990) (pertaining to suits affecting the parent-child relationship).
13
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013 (a)(1) (2003) (The court shall appoint an attorney ad litem
to represent the interests of an indigent parent who opposes termination of the parent-child

This writer accomplished such a termination in one particular case where the defendant
parents, because of their poverty, could not hire a lawyer. The writer, then a father of two toddlers,
empathized with the defendants. What would have happened if an experienced lawyer had spoken
on their behalf? The writer’s supervising prosecutors could have accepted an alternative, such as
supervised visitation until the parents completed anger management and child-rearing counseling. A
clearly adversarial proceeding probably would have aided the parents, increasing the chances that
their momentarily excessive discipline would not result in a permanent punishment. However, their
poverty prevented any meaningful access to the courts. They faced the State of Texas without the
aid of a lawyer.
Since parental termination litigation is classified as a civil proceeding, the law in 1975 Texas
did not provide for court-appointed counsel to assist the indigent parents. The court battle placed a
lawyer against two frightened civilians. The father honestly explained his disciplinary methods, at all
times sincerely asserting the “best interest of the child.” The mother, apparently petrified at the
thought of losing her child, sat mute throughout the trial. The writer anguished over the court’s
decision, concluding that he had inflicted the worst punishment possible on this accused couple: the
14

life sentence of the loss of their baby.

The writer also then expressed the hope that some day our

nation’s High Court would provide indigents accused of parental neglect or abuse in a civil parental
termination hearing with court-appointed counsel since termination is punitive. A few years later,
15

the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature fulfilled that prayer.

This article seeks to explain how certain retroactive statutes, albeit civil in nature, can have
relationship).
14
The father spanked the child for playing with a can of paint. The mother, even though she did
not aid or participate in the corporal punishment, met the same penalty.
15
See generally Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S. 18 (1981), following Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (the right to court-appointed counsel depends upon the
dictates of “fundamental fairness” on a case-by-case basis); TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013 (a)(1)
(2003) (providing for the appointment of attorney for indigent parents in termination
proceedings).

such punitive consequences that they should be constitutionally prohibited. The 1996 IIRIRA
16

legislation,

which replaced the term “deportation” with the concept known as “removal,”

represents one of those statutes that, in specific circumstances, impacts not only retroactively but
17

also punitively.

The writer further contends that removal, when specifically conditioned upon a

prior conviction, results in a loss of liberty that triggers not only due process protections but also ex
18

post facto prohibitions.

In signing one of the 1996 Immigration Acts into law, President Bill

Clinton noted the inherent unfairness in fighting terrorism by including regular hard-working
immigrants: “This bill also makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws
having nothing to do with fighting terrorism. These provisions eliminate most remedial relief for
19

long-term legal residents. . . .”

Finally, the paper addresses much needed reforms involving the 1996 Immigration Acts. A
number of scholars, civil rights leaders, INS officials and jurists have expressed concerns about the
20

regressive and punitive impact of the 1996 legislation, a situation further aggravated by the attack

16

Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. at 3009-540 through 3009-724 (1996), codified as 8 U.S.C. §
1101 et seq.(West 2000) [hereinafter 1996 Immigration Acts].
17
See 8 U.S.C. 1227 (a)(2)(A) (iii) and § 1101 (a)(43) (A)-(U) (1999) (definition and
descriptions of aggravated felonies).
18
This article does not address the constitutionality of removals occasioned upon conduct not
resulting in a conviction. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) refers to non-conviction criminal-conduct grounds
for removal. Included in this category are alien smuggling, marriage fraud, false citizenship
claim, national security violations, and drug abuse and addiction.
19
Statement by President William Jefferson Clinton Upon Signing S. 735 [The Antiterrorism &
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996], 142 CONG. REC. 961-3, 110 Stat. 3009-749 (1996).
20
See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); Nancy Morawetz,
Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97
(1998); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 15 (2003). The
writer prefers classification not as an immigration scholar but as a criminal law and procedure
scholar on the strength of his judicial and prosecutorial experience. See also Steve Lash,
Deportation power changes are pushed, HOUS. CHRON., July 29, 1999, at A9.

21

on the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.

For example, Anthony Lewis, a

prominent columnist for the New York Times, called for reform, referring to the anti-immigrant
22

zealotry and the need to return to the concepts of American decency. Other scholars have argued
that the 1996 Immigration Acts, particularly the aggravated felony provision, violate international
23

law.

Jurists have also noted the plethora of cases generated by this highly controversial
24

legislation.
II.

Concerns Over the Immigration Acts in the American Immigrant Community
Simon Wiesenthal, a victim of Nazi atrocities, and later active in the effort to hunt war

criminals and bring them to justice, once rationalized his zeal by warning that people should always
25

be cognizant of history to avoid its negative repetition.

Our American history has unfortunately

been replete with such examples of racial and ethnic injustice, such as the days of slavery, the frauds
perpetrated on Native Americans, the passage of legislation to exclude Chinese immigrants, the
21

See Edward Hegstrom, Experts Say Immigrants Have Few Rights in Country, HOUS. CHRON.,
Sept. 20, 2001, at A8.
22
Anthony Lewis, 1996 Immigration Act Needs Reforming, HOUS. CHRON., July 3, 2001, at A22.
See also Immigrants Locked Up 3 Years Without Trials, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2001, at A15.
23
The standards utilized by the European Court of Human Rights provide that a deportation order
may be overturned when the interests of the non-citizen outweigh those of the United States.
Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293 (2003).
24
d
See, e.g., St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 408 (2 Cir. 2000), aff’d, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001) (changes in immigration consequences of a conviction require clear congressional intent in
order to be imposed retroactively). As to retroactive effect of plea agreements, see, e.g., Dias v.
st
th
INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1 Cir. 2002); Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290-91 (4 Cir. 2002);
rd
nd
Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 559-60 (3 Cir. 2002); Domond v. INS, 244 F.3d 81, 86 (2 Cir.
th
2001); Leguerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7 Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000).
As to differences in defining the term or as to the effect of an “aggravated felony,” see e.g.,
th
Leocal v. Ashcroft (unpublished) (11 Cir. 2003), cert. granted, “U.S.”, 124 S. Ct. 1405 (2004);
th
th
Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7 Cir. 2004); Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 942 (7
Cir. 2001) (aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are ineligible for cancellation of removal); Le
th
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11 Cir. 1999).
25
See BALT. JEW. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1989 [title and page unknown], available at
www.wiesenthal.com.

inclusion by the United States of Mexican Texas over the complaints in 1845 of Senator John C.
26

Calhoun of adding an inferior group of “colored” people to the white American population, and the
27

public school segregation of both blacks and Latinos through the 1970s.

These historically racist

practices have been substantially outlawed. By the same token, the federal government’s abusive
and constitutionally questionable practices in the immigration arena should cease. Such a result will
mean radical departures from judicial precedence, such as eradicating the fiction that any
28

deportation-related abuses do not constitute punishment.

Even conceding that deportation is civil

in general, it unquestionably loses that characteristic when removal is conditioned upon a penal
29

conviction.

Specific incidents of injustice might assist the reader in the horrific impact the 1996
30

Immigration Acts can have.

One involves a woman who had lived in the United States for twenty-

eight years. In 1989 she was convicted of writing a forged check for under twenty dollars. This
26

David J. Weber (ed.), FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE
MEXICAN AMERICANS 137 (University of New Mexico Press, 1973) (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
th
st
30 Cong., 1 Sess. 98-99). The highly respected Calhoun stated, “Ours, sir, is the Government
of a white race. The greatest misfortunes of Spanish America are to be traced to the fatal error of
placing these colored races on an equality with the white race.” Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
27
See, e.g, Guadalupe Salinas, Mexican Americans and the Desegregation of Schools in the
Southwest, 8 HOUS. L. REV. 929 (1971); Jorge Rangel & Carlos Alcala, De Jure Segregation of
Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 307 (1972).
28
E.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (deportation is not punishment);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (since deportation is not
punishment, neither is indefinite incarceration pending deportation a form of punishment); United
th
States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1 (9 Cir. 1994).
29
See 110 Stat. 3009-597, § 304 (b), creating 8 U.S.C. §
§ 1229b (a) (3) (1994 ed., Supp. V); see definition of aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43).
30
Some incidents do not raise sympathy, such as the case where an alien was convicted of
possession with the intent to deliver two pounds of cocaine, Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d
th
1035 (7 Cir. 2003), and the case of Tuan Ahn Nguyen, Nguyen v. INS, 525 U.S. 852 (2001),
convicted in 1992 of child sexual assault. Erroneously believing he was a US citizen by virtue of
his American soldier father, a soldier in Vietnam, Nguyen, as a deportable alien, faced return to
Vietnam which he left at the age of six. See Patty Reinert, Supreme Court ruling means veteran’s
son may be deported, HOUS. CHRON., June 12, 2001, at A4.

conviction qualified her with the passage of the 1996 Immigration Acts and the retroactive
application of the law to banishment from the United States and from her mother to a country she
31

would not likely recall since she immigrated at the age of four.

The writer further recalls the news

story of a decorated Vietnam veteran in South Texas who received his notice from the INS to appear
and show cause why he should not be deported. It seems this war hero had a drinking problem that
resulted in a felony driving while intoxicated conviction. He had also been sober for several years
32

when he faced deportation.

The federal appellate court for Texas later concluded that felony drunk
33

driving does not meet the “aggravated felony” definition.

This erroneous application of the law did not prevent the extreme punitive result of death.
One of the nineteen aliens who died in the suffocating heat of an enclosed tractor trailer in Victoria,
Texas in May 2003 had been improperly removed as a criminal alien for a driving while intoxicated
conviction. Mateo Salgado, a twenty-year resident of Houston, served his sentence for driving while
intoxicated and then received a government-sponsored trip to the Mexican border. Upon his
34

removal, Salgado called Houston and told his family that he would return soon.
35

the family could only have access to his corpse.

He did return, but

He should never have been exposed to the risks of

sneaking back into the country where he was a permanent resident alien who had not breached his
contract to remain in the United States. There are too many other stories that reflect an ugly side of
31

See Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets--Immigration Law’s New
Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 591 (1998); see Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey,
Plagued by drugs, tribes revive ancient penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 1 (reference to
banishment as “severe” and “excessive”).
32
See Note, Deporting Nonviolent Violent Aliens: Misapplication of 18 U.S.C. §16 (B) to Aliens
Convicted of Driving Under the Influence, 52 DE PAUL L. REV. 901 (2003).
33
th
See, e.g., United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5 Cir. 2001). The writer does not
extend this principle to a death resulting from driving while intoxicated, even a first-time incident.
This would, in the opinion of the writer, constitute a crime of violence. See Teen deaths prompt
INS to deport illegal immigrants for DUIs, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 29, 2000, at A19.
34
Edward Hegstrom, Illegal immigrant died trying to return to family, HOUS. CHRON., May 23,
2003, at A33.
35
Id. Salgado was not identified until more than a week after the tragedy.

36

our nation’s current immigration policy.
III.

Congressional Plenary Power in the Area of Immigration and Naturalization
The courts of the United States have concluded that Congress enjoys plenary, i.e., full and
37

complete, power in the area of immigration.
38

possesses inherent power to deport aliens.

As a sovereign nation, America unquestionably

The nation also has the power to exclude undesirables:

That the government of the United States, through the action
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction
over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every
independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not
exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of
39
another power.
The Court further explained that the powers to regulate foreign commerce and admit subjects of
other nations to citizenship are sovereign powers “restricted in their exercise only by the
40

Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice. . . .”
Congress on matters involving purely

The Court defers to

“political questions,” but we see how the Court later

conceded that it had power in the area of political questions if violations of the constitutional rights
41

of persons in the various states existed.
36

E.g., Ana Radelat, Banned at the Border, HISPANIC 41-46 (Feb. 1998).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712
(1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); see generally Natsu Taylor Saito, The
Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for OnGoing Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 15 (2003).
38
Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 557 (1913). The Supreme Court also held in the Chinese
Exclusion Cases that Congress has the authority to exclude nationals of another country. Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
39
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (emphasis added).
40
Id. at 604.
41
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963) (“one person, one vote”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
37

Unquestionably, one aspect of a nation’s sovereignty is the power to regulate the admission
of aliens. The United States, like any other nation, can base its immigration policy on racial,
42

religious or other suspect grounds.

However, once a person attains permanent resident alien status,
43

American constitutional standards apply.

For years, the treatment of aliens differed on the basis of
44

which government conducted the discriminatory treatment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins
45

action while the Chinese Exclusion Case

involved state

involved federal law. The Supreme Court did not

develop an equivalent equal protection standard for federal action until its decision in Bolling v.
46

Sharpe in 1954. Even before this date, however, the Court had ruled that illegal entrants must be
47

afforded constitutional protections in criminal proceedings.
48

Fong Yue Ting v. United States

addressed the validity of a federal law that required a

Chinese to establish a certificate of residence by the word of at least one white citizen. The Court
upheld this clearly racist statute on the basis of international law and particularly on the absolute and
unqualified right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, equating this power to their right to
49

prohibit and prevent their entrance.

The Court additionally stated:

The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a
banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the
42

See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (federal law required an affidavit
from a white citizen to establish the right of a Chinese alien to a certificate of residence; persons
of Chinese race were not deemed to be credible witnesses).
43
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Court voided a city ordinance on equal
protection ground since the discrimination appeared based on hostility towards the race and
nationality of Yick Wo and his fellow litigants in the laundry business; the litigants were now
aliens who invoke the jurisdiction of the Court).
44
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
45
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889).
46
347 U.S. 497 (1954) (school segregation outlawed in the District of Columbia under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
47
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (voiding a section of the 1892 immigration
act which called for imprisonment at hard labor without a trial).
48
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
49
Id. at 707.

expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is
but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien
who has not complied with the conditions. . . . He has not, therefore,
been deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. .
50
..
The Court concluded by classifying this issue as one best left for resolution to the political
51

department of the government.
IV.

AEDPA and IIRIRA: The 1996 Immigration Acts and the “Aggravated Felony”
52

combined with the Illegal

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
53

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),

[hereinafter referred to as the
54

1996 Immigration Acts] extensively amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).

The INA historically provided in section 212 (c) that the Attorney General could exercise discretion
55

in deciding whether to waive deportation of an alien otherwise subject to deportation or removal.

The 1996 Immigration Acts changed aspects of this law by restricting the circumstances under which
56

aliens could seek relief from the Attorney General or other officials.

Other major changes

involving the administrative and military detention of aliens came with the passage of the PATRIOT
Act, an acronym for the real title of the legislation, “Unifying and Strengthening America by
57

Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”

IIRIRA, enacted a few months after AEDPA, went a step further and repealed section 212
50

Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
Id. at 713. One hundred years later, Congress, the political department, enacted the punitive
immigration acts that are the subject of this article.
52
Pub. L. 104-142, § 401-443, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-81 (1996), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (a)
(7) (2001) [hereinafter 1996 Immigration Acts].
53
Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. at 3009-546 through 3009-724 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et
seq.(West 2000) [hereinafter 1996 Immigration Acts].
54
66 Stat. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. [hereinafter INA].
55
Id.§ 212 (c).
56
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a) (cancellation of removal); § 1229b (b) (cancellation); § 1229c
(voluntary departure); § 1231 (b)(3) (restriction of removal); § 1225 (a) (1) (withdrawal of
application for admission); and § 1158 (political asylum).
57
Pub. L. 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001).
51

(c), replacing it with a new section excluding from the class entitled to relief from removal those
58

persons who had been previously “convicted of any aggravated felony.”

Congress first utilized the

“aggravated felony” concept in 1988, making an alien deportable if convicted of such a described
59

felony, regardless of how long before the crime had been committed.

The 1996 Immigration Acts

went even further in defining the term “aggravated felony,” which, for example, now includes
convictions for theft or burglary if the alien receives a term of imprisonment of at least a year (as
60

opposed to five years in the pre-IIRIRA era).

The amendment further includes convictions for
61

fraud and deceit where the victim lost over $10,000 (as opposed to $200,000 before IIRIRA).

Criminal defense practitioners now have to contend with the dilemma, for example, that a resident
alien with a pre-1996 conviction in which he received a one-year suspended sentence for
misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury became removable on September 30, 1996, the effective
date of the second Immigration Act and the date the resident alien’s previous conviction legislatively
62

transformed from a misdemeanor into an “aggravated felony.”

Finally, Congress expanded the term “aggravated felony” to include any “crime of
63

64

violence” resulting in a prison sentence of at least one year (as opposed to five years before).

The

term “crime of violence” includes offenses which have as an element “the use, attempted use, or
58

110 Stat. 3009-597, § 304 (b), creating 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a) (3) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis
added); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (definition of aggravated felony).
59
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4469-70 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2000).
60
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
61
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (M)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
62
Maynard, supra note 3, at 29; INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000). Appellate courts have
held that misdemeanor shoplifting convictions with a one-year suspended sentence or potential
sentence amount to aggravated felonies. E.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2d
rd
Cir. 2000); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 791-92 (3 Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845
(1999).
63
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994 ed., Supp. V); INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000).
64
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.). Apparently, an
actually served sentence of 364 days in jail custody does not meet the one-year requirement. See
Maynard, supra note 3, at 28; see also Stanley G. Schneider, Post-Conviction Remedies, State Bar
of Texas 2003 Immigration Law Course, Ch. 3.1 (2003).

threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” or “any other offense that
is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
65

property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” The sovereignty rights
and relations between the state and the federal governments begin to fade with the enactment and
enforcement of this provision of the 1996 Immigration Acts.
Since the 1996 Immigration Acts multiplied the number of so-called “aggravated felons” by
expanding the definition and by applying the concept retroactively, the legislation raises serious
66

constitutional questions.

One might determine that some of these new crimes that qualify for the

additional sanction of removal (deportation) are neither “aggravated” nor “felonies.” The term
“aggravated,” for example, when describing a crime, denotes that the criminal activity has been
67

made worse, more severe, or more offensive.

Some of the offenses included do not involve any

violence and thus seem to be far from “aggravated.”
In addition, the 1996 Immigration Acts conflict with other federal legislation that define a
68

“felony” as any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

As a

result, a number of so-called “felonies” under the immigration statutes qualify as misdemeanors
65

18 U.S.C. §§ 16 (a), (b) (2000). Around the United States, many aliens have appeared at show
cause hearings and have been removed for the “crime of violence” of driving while intoxicated.
The Fifth Circuit later reversed its previous ruling and held that driving while intoxicated, without
th
aggravating factors, is not a crime of violence. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5
th
Cir. 2001); contra, Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10 Cir. 2001).
66
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. 5; see generally Landgraf v. USI Film
Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1999) (due process/fair notice concerns created by retroactive
legislation); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment reaches congressional and other federal action).
67
WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 18 (1958).
68
18 U.S.C. § 1 (1) (1984) (emphasis added). Any other offense is a misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 1
(2). Section 1 was repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, §§
211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2027 (1984). Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II § 218 (a)(1), Oct. 12,
1984, 98 Stat. 2027. The historical definition of a felony continued in U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 (c) (1998). Congress threw a curve, however, with its 1996
definition and examples of aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) (A)-(U) (1999).
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under not only the federal criminal code but also state provisions.

One student writer comments

“These laws are not only cruel, but also wildly inconsistent, meting out the same punishment to
lawful permanent residents who commit a misdemeanor offense as they do to undocumented non70

citizens who enter the country to commit a terrorist act.”

For instance, IIRIRA provides that a

crime where the potential, not necessarily the actual, sentence is one year in custody qualifies as an
71

“aggravated felony.”

Yet these one-year-maximum-sentence crimes meet the misdemeanor
72

definition of many state penal codes and the former federal code.
73

In an Orwellian

74

sweep, deportations became “removals.”
75

excludable became “inadmissible.”

Those once described as

However, the most critical changes related to those who

became eligible for removal. Congress mandated that the Attorney General shall take into custody
76

any alien who is “deportable”

by reason of having been convicted of a single crime involving

moral turpitude committed within 10 years after the date of admission of a permanent resident alien
if the crime provided for a sentence of one year or longer, two or more chronologically separate
crimes involving moral turpitude, a controlled substance offense (other than possession of 30 grams
69

E.g., TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 1.07 (23) and (31) respectively provide that a felony includes an
offense punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary and a misdemeanor is one
punishable by fine, by confinement in jail, or by both. The maximum punishment for a
misdemeanor is confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year. TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.21
(2) (1996).
70
Note: Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293, 327-28 (2003).
71
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (1996).
72
TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 1.07 (23) and (31) respectively provide that a felony includes an offense
punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary and a misdemeanor is one punishable by
fine, by confinement in jail, or by both. The maximum punishment for a misdemeanor is
confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year. TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.21 (2) (1996); 18
U.S.C. § 1 (2).
73
G. ORWELL, 1984, at 45 (1949) (reference to the euphemistic replacement of words).
74
Pub. L. 104-208, §§ 308 (e)(1)(E), 308 (e)(2)(C) substituted “removed” for “deported” in the
introductory paragraph. 8 U.S.C. § 1227, Historical and Statutory Notes (1999).
75
Pub. L. 104-208, §§ 308 (e)(1)(E), 308 (e)(2)(C).
76
Congress apparently did not succeed completely in their Orwellian efforts.

or less of marijuana), violations involving a firearm or destructive device, espionage, treason,
making false statements in applications to depart from or to enter the United States, and an
77

aggravated felony at any time after admission.

The Attorney General, subsequent to the 1996

Immigration Acts, concluded that the Attorney General’s Office did not have any authority to waive
78

deportation.

79

The INA defines an aggravated felony by listing 21 classifications and grades of crimes.

Until 1984, the federal criminal code defined a felony as an offense punishable by imprisonment for
80

a term exceeding one year.

The current sentencing classification continues the practice of
81

classifying the lowest felony as one that carries “more than one year” imprisonment.

Class A

misdemeanors are those in which the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is one year or less
82

but more than six months.

However, when Congress amended the INA through the 1996

Immigration Acts, it included convictions for a misdemeanor as an “aggravated felony” when it
specifically included a crime of violence or theft or burglary offenses for which the term of
83

imprisonment is at least one year.

The legality of the contradiction necessarily has to be addressed

by Congress or the courts. That one-day difference in federal criminal law and immigration law
effectively increases the number of permanent resident aliens who need to worry about their eventual

77

8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 (c)(1)(B), (C); 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), (B), (C), (D) (emphasis added).
The Seventh Circuit joins the First and Ninth Circuits in concluding that Congress intended to
apply the amended “aggravated felony’ definition retroactively. Flores-Leon v. INS, 272 F.3d
th
433, 439 (7 Cir. 2001).
78
See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001).
79
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (A)--(U).
80
18 U.S.C. § 1, repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, §§
211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2027 (1984); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 4A1.2
(c) (1998) (For sentencing purposes, a felony offense means any federal, state, or local offense
punishable by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual
sentence imposed) (emphasis added).
81
18 U.S.C. § 3559 (a) (5) (2000).
82
18 U.S.C. § 3559 (a) (6) (2000) (emphasis added).
83
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G); 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (43) (P), (R), and (S).
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removal from the United States. What makes this concern of even greater constitutional impact is
the decision by Congress to apply the aggravated felony label “to an offense described in this
paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law” and to any such offense “regardless of
85

whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.”

Consequently, the 1996 Immigration Acts create serious conflicts for the constitutional right
to procedural and substantive due process of law under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Procedural due process of law guarantees all persons in the United States the right to
notice of the rules by which our conduct will be regulated and punished. Permanent resident aliens
who plead guilty to a crime at a time when punitive removal orders are not mandated expect to move
on to a life free from further government control. In addition, a law that forecloses any opportunity
for relief must be categorized as one that is arbitrary and capricious. The 1996 Immigration Acts
provide that an immigration judge may not consider mitigating factors; such factors are allegedly not
relevant since everything turns on whether the alien was convicted of an “aggravated felony.” In
86

addition, the deportation is not subject to judicial review.
87

patently questionable provision in INS v. St. Cyr.

The Supreme Court addressed this

The Court resolved the constitutional concern by

holding that certain aliens could not be deported retroactively and that Congress did not intend to
88

eliminate habeas corpus in these limited circumstances.
V.

The Supreme Court’s Deportation Rulings--A Constitutional Enigma?
89

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy exemplifies a rather extreme circumstance. The Supreme Court
84

Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, Number of Foreign-Born Reaches All-Time High in U.S.-up to 32.5 Million, available at http://www.hispanicvista.com/html3/061603gi.htm.
85
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (emphasis added); see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A), (B).
Congress also included attempts and conspiracies to commit an enumerated offense, but the
Congress inadvertently or oddly excluded solicitations to commit a crime.
86
IIRIRA §§ 304 (a), 306 (a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2) (C)).
87
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
88
Id. at 320-26.
89
342 U.S. 580 (1952); see also Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) ( non-citizen eligible for
deportation for offense committed several years before the federal deportation law enacted even

in Harisiades permitted the deportation of a legal resident alien because of membership in the U.S.
Communist Party. The membership occurred at a time before U.S. law specifically outlawed such
activity. The Court noted that the involved aliens had been “offered naturalization, with all of the
rights and privileges of citizenship, conditioned only upon open and honest assumption of undivided
90

allegiance to our Government.”

However, the dissent questioned how the majority could uphold

the view that “the power of Congress to deport aliens is absolute and may be exercised for any
91

reason which Congress deems appropriate.” The dissent also noted that “the power of deportation
is . . . an implied one. The right to life and liberty is an express one. Why this implied power should
be given priority over the express guarantee of the Fifth Amendment has never been satisfactorily
92

answered.”

Fifty years later, this nation still has not directly rationalized this constitutional

aberration.
93

Galvan v. Press represents another deportation to rid the United States of an alien affiliated
with the Communist Party. Galvan became a resident of the United States in 1918. He joined the
Communist Party from 1944-46. He was then deported in 1950, even though the U.S. Constitution
allowed Communist Party candidates to appear on California ballots.

Justice Frankfurter, in

upholding the deportation on stare decisis grounds, nevertheless questioned the practice by stating:
“And since the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might
fairly be said also that the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation,
though alien had been in the United States since the age of three); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39
(1924) (no ex post facto claim where Congress in 1920 added deportation as an additional
sanction to the conviction for prior violation of the Selective Service Act and the Espionage Act;
the Court cited the safety and welfare of society as a factor).
90
Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 585. American citizenship is not a bar to deportation. If the
government can establish fraud, then the naturalization can be set aside and the suspect can be
deported. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
91
Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 598 (quoting from Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893)).
92
Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 599 (emphasis in original).
93
347 U.S. 522 (1954).
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should be applied to deportation.”
V.

Deportations/Removals Constitute Punishment

A.

The Constitutional Basis for Deportations
95

The dissents in Fong Yue Ting

are noteworthy. Justice Brewer takes judicial notice of

more than 100,000 resident aliens, persons who have lawfully entered the United States with the
96

intention to remain.

The justice notes that those “who have become domiciled in a country are

entitled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than those who are simply passing
97

through, or temporarily in it, [a concept that] has long been recognized by the law of nations.”

On the question whether deportation constitutes punishment, Justice Brewer emphatically
states:
Deportation is punishment. It involves first an arrest, a deprival of liberty; and,
second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from property. . . . It
needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is
punishment. . . . But punishment implies a trial: “No person shall be deprived of life,
98
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
It will later be shown how individuals, later deemed removable under the 1996 Immigration Acts,
have been subjected to a “trial,” even if they did not know at the time of their plea of guilty that they
would face further punishment, i.e., removal, in the future.
Interestingly, Justice Field, the author of the opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case, also
dissented in Fong Yue Ting. He begins by noting “a wide and essential difference” between
94

Id. at 531. For support that some deportations are downright arbitrary, see United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (alien female married an American while she
worked with the U.S. government in Germany; the Attorney General determined confidentially
that she posed a risk to the United States; Court reasoned that it was not for any court to review
the actions of the political branch of government in excluding a given alien).
95
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
96
Id. at 734 . The most recent census reports that the United States has over thirty-one million
non-citizen residents.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 740.

99

exclusion and deportation of those who have acquired a residence in the United States.

He notes

that the majority opinion is replete with citations to support the exclusion of aliens but only a few
loose observations as to the national power to expel and deport aliens domiciled in the United
100

States.

The writer agrees that individuals who entered the United States with fraudulently obtained
permission deserve to have their status revoked and to be removed from the United States. In those
cases, the federal government never had a genuine opportunity to accept the alien as a resident.
Deception invalidated the agreement, failing at the stage of assent to the terms.

Similarly,

individuals who violate the implicitly given promise of abiding by the laws of the states and of the
United States during their status as permanent resident aliens can lose that status. Our procedural
due process jurisprudence would put those immigrants on notice that their invitation to become
resident aliens, and possibly later American citizens, would be rescinded upon the violation of
certain laws. The real debate centers on the practice of enacting ex post facto laws, a practice so
abhorred for historical reasons by our Founding Fathers that it received not one comment only but
101

instead two prohibitive directives, one for the national government and one for the states.

The United States Constitution does not actually give Congress plenary power over
immigration; it instead gives the Congress the power to establish a “uniform Rule of
102

Naturalization.”

This is far from granting Congress absolute immunity and unrestricted authority

in the “removal” of individuals who have committed “aggravated felonies,” words that have made
103

their way into our legal lexicons through an Orwellian twist.
99

Congress unquestionably has power

Id. at 746.
Id. at 756.
101
See U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl.3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”)
& Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ..”)
102
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
103
G. ORWELL, 1984, at 45 (1949). Orwell’s character discusses Newspeak by stating, “It’s a
beautiful thing, the destruction of words. Of course the great wastage is in the verbs and
100

to determine who has earned the coveted title of American citizen through naturalization. Since the
Constitution remains to this date explicitly silent on the authority of the United States to engage in
the practice of expatriation or banishment of resident aliens, then the courts must identify a provision
that implicitly places this authority in the Congress. Assuming arguendo that the Naturalization
Clause grants Congress this power implicitly, then the remaining question is whether the explicit
provisions of the Constitution that provide all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States the
104

guarantees of equal protection and due process apply to resident aliens as well.

The writer

contends that a resident alien, a person who has gained entitlement to a greater degree of protection
than undocumented aliens, can nonetheless legally face deportation or removal for having been
convicted of a qualifying crime.

However, the writer asserts that such punitive actions can

constitutionally occur only if the legislative enactments overcome ex post facto concerns and meet
105

procedural and substantive due process standards as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
B.

The Role of the Common Law in American Jurisprudence
As the United States and her people battled through the courts with Watergate and other civil

rights crises, jurists making the ultimate assessments oftentimes determined whether rights and
privileges existed at common law. To the American student of the law, it appears that our courts
invite an inherent conflict by mixing principles and attitudes forged during very different periods of
time. Early decisions invited the new republic to discard the common law whenever inapplicable to

adjectives, but there are hundreds of nouns that can be got rid of as well.” In 1983 Walter
Cronkite wrote a preface to this book in which he asserted: “We hear Newspeak in every use of
language to manipulate, deceive, to cover harsh realities with the soft snow of euphemism.” Id. at
1.
104
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-370 (1886) (The Fourteenth Amendment extends
to the protection of non-citizens).
105
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law. . . .”) (governing federal conduct); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(governing state conduct); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-370 (1886).
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the situation or repugnant to other rights and privileges.

Thus, the American common law model,
107

especially beginning in the mid-1950s, provided progressive pronouncements.

On the other hand,

the English model adheres to traditional principles, not even changing where sound reasoning based
108

on development of the truth necessitates an adjustment or reversal of a rule of law.

109

American courts have begun to abandon English common law principles.

A quite recent
th

example involves the abandonment of a common law concept dating back to the 13 century. In
110

Rogers v. Tennessee

the accused faced a murder indictment even though the victim died after the

expiration of a year and a day. The common law recognizes the validity of a murder prosecution if
the death occurs within a year and a day of the assault.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee

acknowledged that the common law had been in force at the time of the death, but the court
nevertheless upheld the validity of the murder indictment, reasoning that the issue had hardly ever
111

surfaced in state law.

The United States Supreme Court sustained the murder conviction, even

though the applicable rule at the time of the fatal act provided for a lesser crime other than
112

murder.

106

The common law is an English mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating

Pawlet v. Clark, 9 U.S. (Cranch) 292 (1815); see generally Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 137, 144 (1829).
107
E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (the precise contours of official
immunity do not have to be derived from the strict liability rules of the often arcane English
common law); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (an indigent defendant must be furnished
with a trial transcript to effectuate appellate review).
108
E.g., The Queen v. Kearley, 2 App.Cas. 228, 2 W.L.R. 656, 2 All E.R. 345 (H.L. 1992)
(Implied statement is hearsay; American federal rules of evidence as interpreted in U.S. v. Zenni,
492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980) declare such indirect assertion is not hearsay because it is not
intended as an assertion. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (a)).
109
E.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (Court held that judicial immunity is limited to
protection from liability for damages; it erects no bar to injunctive and declaratory relief, or the
award of attorney’s fees under the civil rights statute); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (A
state district judge is not immune for administrative, i.e., non-judicial, employment decisions).
110
532 U.S. 451 (2001).
111
Id. at 465-67.
112
Id. at 480-81.
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legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules.

Such rules evolve around principles,
114

which remain firm in the face of formidable attempts to overthrow or to supersede them.

Not

even the American Revolution and its ultimate goal of liberation from the Crown kept the new
115

nation from occasionally citing English common law doctrine as precedent.

Undoubtedly, the

common law had its highly reputable supporters, such as Sir William Blackstone, perhaps the most
influential of these advocates. Professor Blackstone, so enamored with the common law, wrote four
116

volumes regarding the evolution of English law.

Scholars who revere Blackstone’s work adhere

to his warnings against wholesale and radical change of the legal system and his cautions against
117

overturning the entrenched wisdom of the past.

On the other hand, a number of colonies disregarded the English model. For one, very few
law-trained professionals migrated to the New World, and those bold immigrants who came brought
118

with them little support for lawyers.

Second, colonies like New England, centered their law, for

better or worse, so that it would be “agreeable to the word of God,” with absolutely no reference to
119

the common law of England.

Professor Pound provides a third concern against the development

of an American common law prominently shaped by the English model. Pound observed that the
English common law had evolved with trained jurists while the American model, involving “an
120

elective judiciary, holding for short terms, . . . does not give us courts adequate to such a task.”
113

ROSCOE POUND,
OUND
P
].
114

THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (Marshall Jones Co. 1921) [hereinafter

Id.
Id. at 6.
116
See BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 4 Volumes (Wayne
Morrison, ed., 2001, Cavendish Publishing Limited) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
117
Id. at xiii-xiv.
118
PAUL S. REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 18 (Gordon
Press 1977, based on his 1898 thesis at the University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter REINSCH]. As in
other colonies, lawyers were so unpopular in New York that the general cry of the people was “No
lawyer in the Assembly.”
119
REINSCH 11.
120
POUND 7. The writer, a sixteen-year veteran of the trial bench, fully agrees with Professor
115

He criticized the biased and narrow-minded decisions in the early part of the twentieth century as the
121

work of popularly elected judges.

One scholar noted that the more simple, popular and general

parts of the English common law initially influenced colonial legal relations, yet he found in the
colonies originality in legal conclusions, departing widely from the most settled theories of the
122

common law.

Scholars often express respect for the common law, yet the common law serves as
123

the clearly established rule of judicature in only a few cases.

Nothing stated here should suggest any desire to bury the common law in the sacred grounds
of the past in order to make room for an allegedly enlightened new age. The common law affords
American legal scholars and practitioners with superb ammunition in their battle to seek justice. For
instance, in addition to the notable characteristics of predictable rules, the common law effected
individual natural rights and secured individual interests against aggression and arbitrary invasion
124

not only by others but also by state or society.

That, in itself, places the jurisprudence of the

Crown on a pedestal worthy of protection akin to that given by environmentalists to endangered
species. Yet some scholars recognize that certain aspects of our Anglo-American legal traditions
must expire and drift into oblivion, preserved in the history books where they merely serve as
materials for scholars to peruse and possibly yearn for the days of yore.
The writer humbly submits that Professor Pound’s concern about the proper development of
the American common law, including his preoccupation with an elective judiciary, remains with us
today. However, the distress today involves not only elected judges but also appointed judges. The
political element so dominates the election and selection of judges in America today that the public
Pound’s observations. This opinion from such a noted scholar furthers the view that the United
States Supreme Court, comprised of jurists who serve for life, needs to fulfill their mission as set
forth in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (a statute in conflict with the
Constitution is void ).
121
POUND 7.
122
REINSCH 7.
123
Id. at 57.
124
Id. at 101.
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has begun to have less confidence in our judiciary and its lack of independence.

The 1980s

brought this nation twelve consecutive years of Reagan-Bush, a political era marked by a policy or at
126

least a practice of appointing youthful and extremely conservative lawyers to the federal judiciary.
C.

Do Removals/Deportations Constitute Punishment Under Traditional Concepts?
A review of English common law history leads us to several examples where the English

courts utilized the practice known as banishment or transportation, the ancient equivalent of today’s
127

deportation.

The primary distinction between these two practices involves the characteristics of

the candidates for exile and disappearance from the nation that removes the person. In England the
deportees were citizens or subjects of the Crown who had, pursuant to due process of law, lost their
right to remain among the civilized people of the English countryside. Their banishment came as an
128

integral part of the punishment for the conviction of a crime.

According to Blackstone, the exiling
129

or banishing of subjects are punishments that the common law once imposed.
125

On the contrary, in

For example, Harris County (Houston), Texas had in the 1970s an all-Democratic judiciary.
Today it is 100 per cent controlled by the Republican Party from the County Courts to the two
appellate courts. Some candidates even advertise their partisan label as a job qualification. See
generally Stephen Murdoch, The Politics of Judicial Nominations, WASH. LAWYER, Sept. 2002,
at 26.
126
See generally Marianne Means, Estrada right to quit nomination fight, HOUS. CHRON., Sept.
13, 2003, at A 40 (“Democrats are just as partisan but not as unified nor driven to reshape the
judiciary along a hard-edged ideology.”); Michael Olivas, Being Latino doesn’t qualify Estrada to
be judge, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2003, at A 31 (Law Professor Olivas refers to Estrada as an
ideologue who hides his views and lacks experience). As a federal prosecutor, the writer appeared
before Judge Hayden Head, appointed by President Reagan at the age of thirty-three to the district
court bench in Corpus Christi, Texas. The same president later appointed Edith Jones, about the
same age, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding their youth and conservative
ideologies, both have distinguished themselves in their respective courts.
127
See generally Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 115 (1999).
128
See 1 BLACKSTONE 102.
129
Id. (emphasis added). See also Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why
at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 305, 345 (2000).

130

America today the deportees are legal resident aliens

whose banishment and transportation out of

the United States sometimes involves conduct which occurred at a time when the resident alien
lacked notice that his or her conduct would, in some indefinite time in the future, result in his
involuntarily leaving his job, his spouse, his children and his grandchildren while he seeks to begin a
new life in a country where generally he no longer has any established roots.
This writer submits that removals or deportations, modern-day banishments, constitute
131

punishments. Deportations do not serve as treatment for an alleged offender;
132

involve efforts to supervise.

nor does a removal

Instead, the removals constitute punitive measures separately
133

appended to and/or conditioned upon convictions for criminal activity.

The INA defines

“conviction” as a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication has been
withheld, where “(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge
134

has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”

Arguably, an alien who receives a deferred adjudication type of probation or community supervision,
a program that seeks to give wrongdoers a second chance by clearing their record by dismissal of the

130

This article does not question the removal of undocumented persons so long as our due process
protections are utilized to minimize the risks of abuse. In the United States constitutional rights
have been historically extended to resident aliens on a basis similar to citizens. See, e.g.,
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Court held unconstitutional a Civil Service
Commission regulation requiring citizenship for most federal civil service positions); In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (Court voided a Connecticut law requiring citizenship as a
prerequisite for admission to the bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 386 (1886) (Court held aliens are entitled to equal protection of the laws).
131
E.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997).
132
E.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U. S. 694 (2000) (re-imposition of supervised release does
not violate the ex post facto clause).
133
One way to qualify for removal under the 1996 Immigration Acts is to have a conviction for an
aggravated felony committed on, after or even before the effective date of the 1996 legislation. 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A).
134
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A) (emphasis added).

135

conviction, can be removed under the 1996 Immigration Acts.

In some cases, where the status of a

“conviction” bothers the government’s immigration attorney, the attorney instead relies on the INA’s
requirement of showing an unlawful presence in the United States and/or alien smuggling
136

activities.

What makes the current practice in the United States suspect is the inclusion of punishment,
specifically removal or deportation, for convictions that did not mandate that sanction prior to the
1996 Immigration Acts. In other words, the 1996 Acts clearly impose a condition that adversely
affects the liberty interest of the non-citizen resident alien. As such, that action should meet the
constitutional standards of due process and of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Our
137

constitutional law forbids retroactively increasing the punishment for an existing offense.

As a

people, Americans, regardless of status, possess a fundamental fairness interest in having the
government abide by the rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under which it can
138

deprive a person of his or her liberty.

A recent Supreme Court case provides some interesting history on the concept known as
139

banishment.

The Court’s dissent in Stogner discussed how only a parliamentary act could subject

an individual to banishment in 17th-century England and how Parliament’s power to pass such acts
140

was unquestioned.
135

Most relevant, however, is the comment that a “sanction of banishment was
th

E.g., Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5 Cir. 1999) (successful completion of deferred
adjudication in Texas constituted a conviction); accord, United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94
(2d Cir. 1999) (INA does not indicate need to interpret in accordance with state law).
136
th
E.g., Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F3d 804, 817 n. 15 (5 Cir. 2002) (reference to standards
of proof under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (1) (B), (E) (i)). The relaxed procedures in these immigration
cases allow the use of hearsay statements by the investigating agent, who is permitted to produce a
Form I-213, where the transported aliens’ statements are recorded.
137
E.g., Dep t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
138
See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (Ex Post Facto Clause is violated where the rules of
evidence changed, allowing less testimony for conviction than the law required at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense).
139
See generally Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2466-69 (2003).
140
Id. at 2467 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

acknowledged as a punishment provided for by the existing laws, both at the time of Clarendon’s
141

trial and afterwards.”

The contrast between the rights from banishment of the English citizen

and the American resident alien blurs into irrelevance when we superimpose American
constitutional protections on the legal map. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and the Fourteenth
142

Amendments discuss the rights of “persons,”

the drafters perhaps recognizing the classification of

slaves as non-citizens and the involvement of people from other countries in our nation’s evolution.
The post-Civil War amendment obviously sought to assure that all persons, not just citizens,
received the constitutional safeguards. Aliens accordingly receive protection under this
143

amendment.

Some authorities exist to support the claim that aliens held by our government

outside United States territory have no constitutional protections. For example, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals held in 2003 that detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba have no right
to hearings in United States courts since they are not entitled to due process rights under the
144

Constitution.

While the writer does not necessarily agree with this principle, the rationale

nonetheless suggests that those persons who reside legally in the United States should enjoy full due
145

process protections.
D.

Is Removal, Conditioned Upon a Criminal Conviction, a Punishment?
A critical question surfaces as to whether a legislated response to conduct, whether deemed

criminal or civil, is classified as “punishment” or as a mere “sanction.” Regardless of the label the
141

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 569
(1938)); see generally Craies, Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L. Q. REV. 388, 392
(1890) (“Banishment, perpetual or temporary, was well known to the common law”); An Act for
Punishment of Rogues, 39 Eliz. 1, c.4, s. 4 (1597) (permitting banishment of dangerous rogues);
the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, s. 28 (1829) (providing for the banishment of
Jesuits).
142
U. S. CONST. amend. 14.
143
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982).
144
See Sam Hananel, Prisoners held at Guantanamo have no U.S. rights, court rules, HOUS.
CHRON., March 12, 2003, at A8; Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
145
Accord, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (emphasis added).

response receives, another inquiry centers on whether the designation lessens the need for
intervention of protections possibly found in the United States Constitution. Webster defines
“punish” as follows: “to cause to undergo pain, loss, etc., as for a crime” and “to impose a penalty
146

for [an offense].”

147

Something is “punitive” if it inflicts or is concerned with punishment.
148

term “punishment” further indicates “harsh treatment.”

The

On the other hand, a “sanction” has an

almost contrary meaning. One view has a sanction meaning support or approval while the other
149

denotation, the one addressed in this article, refers to a coercive measure,

such as an economic

boycott or payment of a fine. Thus, removal is far from a mere sanction when the removal is
conditioned upon a conviction for a qualifying crime. The removals authorized by the 1996 Act
qualify as an after-the-fact increase in punishment.
Writers in the field of criminal law have sought to distinguish the boundaries of criminal
150

punishment as opposed to other coercive burdensome but non-criminal sanctions.

For example,

in the immigration field, deportation or removal is provided as a coercive sanction when the agents
identify an undocumented entrant. The administrative process of immigration law enforcement is
then triggered. At this stage the law does not call for criminal punishment. The INS agents dutifully
make entries in their files that an undocumented alien entered the United States and that the alien
received a voluntary departure or that he underwent a deportation hearing. All this occurs in civil
administrative proceedings.
The fact that this removal arises in an allegedly non-criminal setting does not remove the
punitive aspect of the removal. On the other hand, when a sanction is imposed in a criminal court,

146

WEBSTER S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 427 (V. Neufeldt ed., 1990) (emphasis added).
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 520.
150
G. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 4, 5 (1998), quoted in M. GARDNER & R.
SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 39
rd
(3 ed. 2001) [hereafter CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT].
147

or pursuant to a criminal conviction, it is unquestionably punitive. The fact that a federal law
retroactively incorporates state (or federal) criminal conduct that resulted in a conviction and adds a
removal sanction does not make it less punitive. The sanction would not have occurred but for the
criminal conviction. At this point constitutional protections of due process of law and the Ex Post
Facto Clause must stand as barriers to the trampling of constitutional rights.
In urging radical departures from precedence, the writer is not oblivious to the well151

established principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull
152

Calder the Court stated the Ex Post Facto Clause is limited to criminal cases.

in 1798. In

Since deportations

or removals have been judicially classified as civil in nature, there is arguably no constitutional
protection.

However, a scholar has taken the position that we look at the totality of the

circumstances in deciding if a practice should receive constitutional scrutiny:
[T]here are recurrent problems in assessing the punitive nature of other
sanctions, such as ... expatriation, deportation. ... That the legislature has identified
these sanctions as civil in nature does not control the constitutional issue, for if the
sanction is punitive, if it constitutes “punishment,” then regardless of the legislative
153
label, the process is criminal and the constitutional guarantees apply.
Another writer defines punishment in terms of five elements:

151

1.

It must involve pain or have other unpleasant consequences;

2.

It must be for an offense against legal rules;

3.

It must be of an actual offender for his offense;

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); see also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (Where a
physician is convicted of abortion, a felony, the state is seeking not to further punish such a
criminal but to protect its citizens from physicians of bad character when it makes it a crime to
practice medicine).
152
Id. at 391.
153
G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 408-09 (1978), quoted in CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENT 39; see Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (For a civil confinement statute to
avoid being punitive in nature, the ultimate purpose must be to treat and not to punish) and United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (Court found the pre-trial detention of a criminal
defendant to be regulatory and not punitive).

4.

It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the
offender; and

5.

It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal
154

system against which the offense is committed.

It is the position of the writer that the term punishment includes the practice, currently referred to in
our federal law as “removal,” which has over the years encountered euphemistic synonyms.
Historically, removal has been known as banishment, transportation, exile, expatriation, deportation,
155

to name but a few.

In his writings on the common law of England, Blackstone, the source for our

American jurisprudence, elaborates on the personal liberties violated when a person is driven from
his country:
A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty, is, that every Englishman
may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases; and not to be
driven from it unless by the sentence of the law. ... But no power on earth, except the
authority of parliament, can send any subject of England out of the land against his
will; no, not even a criminal. For exile, and transportation, are punishments at
present unknown to the common law; and, whenever the latter is now inflicted, it is
either by the choice of the criminal himself to escape a capital punishment, or else by
the express direction of some modern act of parliament. To this purpose the great
charter declares, that no freeman shall be banished, unless by the judgment of his
156
peers, or by the law of the land.

A formal removal order further aggravates the alien’s conduct when the alien’s spouse is
faced with the dilemma of remaining in the United States to work and provide for their children or
154

H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-6 (1968), quoted in CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENT 40; see also T. Hobbes, Leviathan 353, 355 (C. MacPherson ed. 1971), quoted in
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 42.
155
See 1 BLACKSTONE 102; see, e.g., Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)
(deportation of a permanent resident alien is “the equivalent of banishment or exile”); however,
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1951), later repeated the view that deportation is not a criminal
proceeding and has never been held to be punishment. 342 U.S. at 537.
156
1 BLACKSTONE 102 (emphasis added).

157

returning to the life of poverty or persecution that they initially abandoned.

A removal

requirement pursuant to a criminal conviction should thus be legislatively articulated
contemporaneously as part of the punishment attached to the crime. That is the only means by
which a resident alien or other person will have adequate notice as to the consequences of a waiver
of a trial by jury and a guilty plea resulting in a conviction, protections which the United States
158

Constitution grants to all persons regardless of citizenship.

Even if removal is not clearly

articulated as a condition of a criminal act, such drastic governmental action satisfies the concept of
punishment where it is triggered by a conviction. Deportation has been equated to a forfeiture of
159

residence and thus a penalty.
VI.

The Ex Post Facto Clause

A.

A Review of Supreme Court Ex Post Facto Decisions
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution refers to legislative acts when it
160

provides “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”

It is consequently necessary

to proceed primarily and initially with this constitutional standard in determining the validity of

157

See generally id. at 343 (“The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children,
is a principle of natural law; ... they would be in the highest manner injurious ... if they only gave
their children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.”)
158
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. ...”); see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); see U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law”) (emphasis added in text and footnote).
159
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (deportation is a drastic measure and at times
the equivalent of banishment or exile); see Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey, Plagued by drugs,
tribes revive ancient penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 1 (reference to banishment as a
“severe and bygone punishment”).
160
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.3. The principle is sometimes referred to by the Latin phrase nulla
poena sine lege, which basically means “no punishment without a law authorizing it.” BRYAN A.
th
GARNER (ed.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (7 ed.1999) (emphasis added).

federal legislation which removes permanent resident aliens from the United States on the basis of
having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The concerns with ex post facto laws prompted an
essay comment by James Madison that such laws are contrary to the principles of the social
161

compact.

162

An early case involving the interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause is Beazell v. Ohio,

a

case that addressed a change in the law from a separate to a joint trial for persons indicted jointly.
The defendant argued that such a change violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court disagreed
since the change involved only the rules of procedure and not the traditional substantive matters
163

addressed in Calder.

The Court further stated that the Constitution intended through the Clause to
164

secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation.

Interestingly, the

Court emphasized that the “criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the
offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be
165

altered by legislature enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused.”

Whether the removal is classified by statute or by the courts as civil in nature is irrelevant for
166

the purposes of deportations that result from pre-1996 convictions.

167

In United States v. Ward

the Supreme Court stated that whether a statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal requires
answers to two questions: first, did Congress designate the penalty as civil or criminal; second, if the
penalty has a civil designation, is it so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate Congress’
168

intention.
161

It is the writer’s contention that the mere reference of a sanction, in this case removal, to

THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 at 282 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
269 U.S. 167 (1925).
163
Id. at 170.
164
Id. at 171.
165
Id. at 170.
166
See generally Pace v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 399, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (“In order to be a
forbidden ex post facto measure, a statute that is civil in nature on its face must effect a
punishment”).
167
448 U.S. 242 (1980).
168
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
162

an event, specifically a criminal conviction, suffices to classify the action as punishment. The
reaction is then beyond a mere sanction. Once mandated by federal statute, what could once be
termed a “sanction” graduates to the level of de jure punishment. The removal action serves to
promote the retributive, preventive and deterrent aspects of our punishment system.
When Congress enacted the 1996 Immigration Acts, it enlarged the class of individuals who
could be deported for aggravated felonies. Congress effectively created two constitutional problems.
First, it created an ex post facto issue by declaring that the aggravated felony provision applies
regardless of when the conviction occurred, even if it preceded the effective date of the act. Second,
Congress created a substantive and procedural due process concern because some crimes are neither
169

felonies nor aggravated.

Additionally, most lawyers, including even board-certified criminal law

specialists, lack the ability to predict future political and legal mandates. When those accused or
their lawyers waive their jury trial right and plead guilty or nolo contendere, neither knew that the
convictions would thereafter result in additional sanctions or punishments.

Such issues have

170

resulted in an incredibly high number of court confrontations in recent years.

Undoubtedly, the battle to have the High Court extend the application of the Ex Post Facto
Clause to civil immigration deportation proceedings faces an almost insurmountable history of long171

established judicial precedence.
169

Since 1798, the Supreme Court has conclusively held that the

The 1996 Immigration Acts, in their retroactive aspect, create arbitrary and capricious results by
redefining the felony concept in federal law. The Acts also eliminate the concept of adequate
notice of negative implications for one’s conduct, especially as the conduct relates to the waiver of
constitutional rights at a time when the negative implications were not capable of being known.
170
E.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 (2001);
th
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 310 F3d 825 (5 Cir. 2002)
(whether or not transporting aliens constitutes an aggravated felony); United States v. Trinidadth
Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9 Cir. 2001) (intoxication assault does not constitute a crime of
d
violence); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2 Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243
th
th
F.3d 921, 924 (5 Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7 Cir. 2001); Tapia-Garcia v.
th
INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10 Cir. 2001).
171
See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Quite recently, the First Circuit reiterated
that the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated by a civil deportation. Seale v. INS, 323 F3d 150,

172

Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal matters.

However, Blackstone

recognized that the common law could change when he stated that stare decisis “admits of
173

exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason. . . .”

Blackstone

further recognized that the common law was English in origin, suggesting that the American
174

colonies had to adopt and apply it in appropriate circumstances.

Wise men and women have often articulated that a nation is judged by how their laws and
their courts treat people within their jurisdiction. The United States, in spite of early constitutional
aberrations, has, through her courts, extended protections to persons at all levels of the social, racial
175

and political spectrum.

We should not allow political extremism, exacerbated by economic fears

and other concerns of the American public, to dictate a change in the role of the courts in protecting
176

the rights of the less privileged.

Unfortunately, the terrorist attacks on America’s towers and

defense center have driven several public officials to support measures that restrict the civil liberties
177

of not only Americans but also resident and other aliens in this country.

The federal Ex Post Facto Clauses provide limitations on criminal prosecutions for acts that
st

159-160 (1 Cir. 2003); accord, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1951).
172
See Calder generally. The Court has further distinguished retrospective laws from ex post
facto laws, holding that retroactive legislation is not necessarily in conflict with the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160
(1890); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894).
173
1 BLACKSTONE 69.
174
See id. at 107-08.
175
E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (aliens); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (Latino citizens); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (African American
school children); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (undocumented alien school children).
176
For example, in 1994 California voters, under the leadership of Governor Pete Wilson,
approved Proposition 187, an effort to deny education, social services and some health benefits to
undocumented immigrants. A federal judge ruled that the effort violated the Constitution. Judge
overturns prop. 187, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 19, 1998, at A23.
177
Reinert, Experts Fear Net Ensnarls Liberties, H OUS. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001 at A1 (Attorney
General Ashcroft unsuccessfully has asked Congress for authority to jail immigrants indefinitely,
without charges or a visit to a magistrate as well as the authority to secretly search people s
homes).
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were not proscribed at the time committed.

The Founding Fathers, apparently addressing the
179

Congress, included that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,”
180

the next section repeated the message to the states.

and then in

Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence has

evolved to include various circumstances. For instance, if an act was already classified as a crime,
then a violation of the constitution occurred if the legislative branch aggravated the crime, for
181

example by changing the degrees of murder, or openly increased the punishment,

or reduced the

182

measure of proof necessary to convict the accused.

Take the situation of a recidivist who discovers that after his two prior felony convictions,
his home state decided to pass a “three strikes and you are out” law, making him eligible for life
without parole upon a new felony accusation. The previous statutory scheme provided that an
habitual violator could qualify for parole upon the receipt of good conduct and other credits. At trial,
his lawyer asserts that the change in the law is ex post facto since he had already been convicted and
had served his sentences for the two prior crimes. Without those two convictions as enhancements
of the punishment range, he qualifies for parole. However, counsel will likely lose this plea since
courts have historically held that a statute is not ex post facto because it increases the punishment for
a subsequently-committed crime where the increase results from an enhancement allowed by the

178

See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.3.
180
Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law . . . .”).
181
See, e.g., Scafati v. Greenfield, 390 U.S. 713, 88 S. Ct.1409 (1967) (statute forbade deductions
for good conduct time during the first six months re-incarceration following parole violation).
182
E.g., DeWoody v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 52, 87 Cal. Rptr.210 (1970) found an
impermissible ex post facto legislatively-created presumption of driving under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor where the proof established a certain level of alcohol in the driver’s blood.
The law took effect after the arrest of the accused. The new evidentiary system would allow
conviction on less proof than previously required. Accord, Plachy v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 405,
239 S.W. 979 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922) (change in the accomplice statutory requirement of
corroboration in prosecutions involving sellers of intoxicating liquors two weeks after the
indictment).
179

183

prior convictions.

The Supreme Court has long been involved with the protection of constitutional rights in
civil proceedings. For example, in juvenile adjudication proceedings, legislative policy dictates that
youthful offenders be treated as non-adults. However, the courts generally held that this policy did
not deprive children of rights that adults had when they faced quasi-criminal accusations in adult
184

court. For example, the Court in In re Gault

decided that juveniles have the right to adequate

notice and counsel and protection of their privilege against self-incrimination. The Court followed a
185

few years later with In re Winship

where the Court stated that even though a juvenile adjudication

proceeding is civil in nature, the proof necessary for an adjudication must be based on the beyond a
186

reasonable doubt standard, a standard reserved for criminal cases.
187

More recently, in Seling v. Young,

the State of Washington enacted a statute that

authorized the commitment of sexually violent predators to a treatment facility where the offender is
in the custody of an agency dealing with social and health services. The act defines a sexually violent
predator as someone who has been convicted of, or charged with, a crime of sexual violence and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. The accused in Young was

183

See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S. Ct.389 (1901); State v. Dowden,
137 Iowa 573, 115 N.W. 211 (1908).
184
387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967). A few years before In re Gault, the Court ruled in Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) that the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to adult status must comport
with due process.
185
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
186
In spite of the extension of rights known in the criminal process to the civil juvenile process,
the Court has held that trial by jury is not constitutionally required in the adjudicatory phase of the
state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543
(1971). The Court distinguished the right to a trial by jury from other constitutional rights
accorded juveniles, pointing out that these prior rights emphasized the integrity of the fact finding
process and rationalizing that there is nothing to confirm that the jury is a necessary component of
accurate fact finding.
187
531 U.S. 250 (2001).

convicted of six rapes. Prior to his release, the State filed a petition to commit Young to the
treatment facility as a sexually violent predator. Young appealed his commitment to the facility
arguing that the law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Young argued that
the Act, as applied, violated the U.S. Constitution since the conditions in the facility were similar to
188

being incarcerated.

189

The Court disagreed with Young, basing its decision on Kansas v. Hendricks

where the

Court addressed the issue of whether the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was punitive in
nature. In addressing the issue, the Court stated that the question of whether an act is civil or
190

criminal in nature is determined by statutory construction.

In Hendricks the court held that the

court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the statute to establish civil proceedings. A
court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act provides the
clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the
191

State’s intention.

Based upon Hendricks, the Court in Young held that the Washington statute was

enacted to be civil in nature, concluding that “the conditions of confinement were largely explained
192

by the State’s goal to incapacitate, not to punish.”

Therefore, based upon the precedent set in

Hendricks, the Court held the non-punitive statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
193

United States Constitution.

188

See id. at 259-60.
521 U.S. 346 (1997)
190
531 U.S. at 261;see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1951) (Deportation is not a
criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment).
191
Young, 531 U.S. at 261.
192
Id. at 262.
193
Id. at 267. The Supreme Court has also held that changes in parole consideration intervals from
every three to every eight years in life sentences did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause since it
did not create a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the crime.
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 251 (2000); see also California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514
U.S. 499 (1995).
189

The Supreme Court recently encountered an ex post facto violation. InCarmell v. Texas

194

the Court reviewed the amendment of a Texas statute that allowed for a person to be convicted of a
sexual offense based upon the victim’s testimony along with other corroborating evidence. The 1993
amendment allowed convictions based upon the victim’s uncorroborated testimony alone. The
prosecution charged Carmell with 15 counts of various sexual offenses that began in 1991 and ended
in 1995. Carmell contested convictions for several pre-amendment counts. The Court held that the
195

pre-amendment convictions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Citing Weaver v. Graham,

the

Carmell Court stated: “The critical question [for an ex post facto violation] is whether the law
196

changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.”

The State argued that

the amended statute did not increase the punishment nor change the elements of the offense. The
Court however found that the amended statute reduced the amount of evidence required to
197

convict.

198

Carmell further cited Calder v. Bull

where Justice Chase categorized four types of ex

post facto laws: (1) Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which
was innocent when done criminal; (2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed; (3) Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed; and (4) Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
199

commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.

Whether a statute is criminal or civil in nature, one must look to the legislative intent when
200

the statute was enacted.
194

201

In Kansas v. Hendricks,

the State of Kansas enacted the Sexually

529 U.S. 513 (2000).
450 U.S. 24 (1981).
196
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197
See Carmell, 529 at 532-33; see also id. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
199
Id. at 390-91.
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See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
201
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
195

Violent Predator Act to provide for the “civil commitment” of sexual offenders in a treatment center
for long-term care and treatment.

Hendricks, classified as a sexually violent offender, was

committed to a treatment program required by the act, and he complained that the statute violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause. Hendricks argued that the Act established criminal proceedings and a form of
punishment. He specifically argued that because he had already been convicted and served his term
of confinement, the Predator Act allowed for additional punishment based upon his past acts.
The Court held that the Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The majority held that
to determine whether the Act established civil or criminal proceedings, the Court must look to the
legislative intent when the Act was established and enacted. Based upon the legislative intent the
Court determined that on the face of the statute the legislature did not intend to create a criminal
202

proceeding.

To overcome this, the person challenging the statute must show “the clearest proof

that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to
203

deem it civil.”

Hendricks further states that the purpose of the statute is not retroactive since it does not
punish the sexual offender for his past conduct. The offender’s past conduct is used primarily for the
purpose of “[demonstrating] that a mental abnormality exists or to support a finding of future
204

dangerousness.”

205

Citing United States v. Salerno,

the Court reasoned: “Although the civil

commitment scheme at issue here does involve an affirmative restraint, ‘the mere fact that a person
is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed
206

punishment.’”

Therefore, based upon the Court’s reasoning, they found the Act to be civil in

nature and not punitive and thus not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

202

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
204
Id. at 362.
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206
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207

Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch

represents a forceful authority for the proposition

that the 1996 Immigration Acts enact punitive removal orders in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.

Authorities arrested members of the Kurth family for harvesting marijuana on their

property.

The Kurths pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to sell.

Subsequently they entered into a plea agreement and the family members were sentenced. Montana
enacted the Dangerous Drug Tax Act prior to the Kurths’ arrest. The Act provided “that the tax was
208

to be ‘collected after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied.’”

The Kurths

challenged the constitutionality of the Montana tax under the Double Jeopardy Clause. They argued
that the tax was punitive in nature because the legislature conditioned it upon commission of a
crime.
The Court held that the tax violated the Constitution. In evaluating this issue, the Court cited
209

United States v. Halper

where the Court stated that the legislature’s description of a statute as
210

civil does not foreclose the possibility that it has a punitive character.

Kurth Ranch evaluated the

tax and how it was applied under the Act. The Court pointed out that the tax was conditioned upon
211

the commission of a crime.

Only after the crime is committed and the person arrested is the tax

imposed. Further, the tax was different from other types of taxes in that the tax was imposed on
illegal activities.
In Halper, the defendant was charged and convicted on 65 counts of violating the criminal
false claims statute. Subsequent to his conviction and sentence, the Government brought an action
under the civil False Claims Act. Based upon his criminal conviction, the District Court granted a
summary judgment for the Government. Under the remedial provision of the act he was liable to the
207

511 U.S. 767 (1994).
Id. at 770.
209
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
210
Id. at 442.
211
The writer contends that the removal complained of in this article is one conditioned upon a
conviction based upon conduct finalized prior to the effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts.
208

government for more than $130,000. Based upon the large amount, the District Court found it to be
a second punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The Government appealed to the Supreme
Court to clarify whether a civil penalty such as a statutory penalty can constitute punishment for the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Court held that the statutory penalty was a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
government argued that only a second criminal prosecution would give rise to double jeopardy,
adding that the statute involved is civil in nature. In addition, based upon statutory construction, they
contended the Act was not intended to be criminal in nature. The Court held, however, that even if
the Act was intended to be civil in nature, the penalty may be so extreme as to constitute
212

punishment.

The Court further held that when determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause

of the Constitution has been violated depends not upon statutory interpretation or intent of the
213

legislature, but on the character of the sanctions that are imposed on the individual.

The Court

stated, “Simply put, a civil as well as criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as
214

applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.”

In concluding that the statute in

this case did constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy, the Court stated that a civil
215

sanction serving a remedial, retributive or deterrent purpose was punishment.
216

The Supreme Court later decided Hudson v. United States

and criticized its holding in

Halper for deviating from longstanding double jeopardy principles by focusing on whether the
217

sanction was so grossly disproportionate to the harm caused as to constitute punishment.

Hudson

restates the principle that whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a

212

Halper, 490 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 447.
214
Id. at 448.
215
Id.
216
522 U.S. 93 (1997).
217
Id. at 101-02.
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218

matter of statutory construction.

A legislature could indicate expressly or impliedly if the statute is

criminal or civil. If the legislature considers the law to be criminal, much of the inquiry is
completed.

However, even in those situations where the legislature indicates an intention to

establish a civil penalty, the Court inquires further as to whether the statutory scheme is so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to “transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a
219

criminal penalty.”

In addition, the Hudson Court noted the need to adhere to the factors listed in Kennedy v.
220

Mendoza-Martinez

as useful guidelines. These include 1) whether the sanction involves an

affirmative disability or restraint; 2) whether the sanction has been historically regarded as
punishment; 3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 4) whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment--retribution and deterrence; 5) whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime; 6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it; and 7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
221

purpose assigned.
VII.
A.

Pre-1996 Act Convictions Lead to Unconstitutional Ex Post Facto Removals
The Punitive Aspects of the Removal Provisions of the 1996 Immigration Acts
Let us begin with the reality that the legislative history of the 1996 Immigration Acts is
222

punitive in its major and overriding aspects.

The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center

basement and the 1995 destruction of the Oklahoma City federal building incited Congress to act.
The first act passed, the AEDPA, has a section entitled “Terrorist and Criminal Alien Removal and

218

Id. at 99.
Id.
220
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
221
522 U.S. at 99-100, quoting from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169
(1963).
222
The 1996 Immigration Acts, in their removal provisions, can arguably be classified as
regulatory.
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223

Exclusion.”

In addition, representatives for the Department of Justice asserted: “The chief target

of these reforms are the statutory and administrative protections . . . that enable alien terrorists to
224

delay their removal from the U.S.”

Furthermore, applying the Kennedy factors to the 1996 Immigration Acts and its removal
provisions for those convicted of aggravated felonies, the immigration sanctions clearly adopt a
punishment scheme. Since the removals can relate back to convictions finalized prior to the
effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts, they send a clear signal that the statute is punitive. The
removal action is conditioned upon an alien’s conviction for a specified crime. As such, the Act
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. First, the removal sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint. Once convicted of an aggravated felony, the resident alien is given a notice to appear, i.e.,
summoned to show cause as to why he should not be removed. The alien seldom wins this contest.
A long-term resident alien with substantial equities could qualify for removal from his entire family,
friends, property and employment.
Second, removal from one’s country of residence has historically been regarded as
punishment. It may have been known as transportation, exile, expatriation, or banishment in the
days of the common law, but it nonetheless served as punishment for criminal activities. Third,
removal is triggered under the 1996 Immigration Acts by conviction of a crime, all of which require
a finding of scienter (aggravated felonies, crimes of violence, drugs, etc.). Fourth, the removal seeks
to promote the traditional aims of punishment, which prominently include retribution and deterrence.
This factor suffices clearly insofar as a prospective crime is involved, but it is constitutionally
repugnant since the conduct to which the removal attaches occurs in the past as opposed to the
present or the future.
Retribution for conduct not explicitly classified as punishable by removal is just plain mean
223
224

142 CONG. REC. 948 (1996).
Id. at 948-49.

and shocking to the sensibilities of our free society. One could expect such conduct in a totalitarian
state, but for this to exist in American jurisprudence is highly aberrant.

Seeking to impose

deterrence for conduct not explicitly classified as punishable by removal is quite simply arbitrary and
capricious. One who becomes aware after the fact of a sanction imposed subsequent to alleged
improper conduct can hardly be deterred. The inevitable result is further punishment in a form that
Congress should have imposed ab initio.
Fifth, and perhaps the most explicit factor establishing removal as punishment, the removal
sanction is conditioned upon behavior already classified as a crime. If one commits an aggravated
felony, then removal is a related punishment. The writer sees no constitutional problem with this
type of law. However, the flaw occurs when the 1996 Immigration Acts increase the punishment for
previously committed crimes. Sixth, the alternative purpose arguably assigned to the removal
provision centers on the plenary power of Congress in the field of immigration and naturalization.
The writer has previously asserted that the Constitution grants Congress the explicit power to
regulate naturalization, and implicitly immigration as well, but Congress does not possess the
plenary power to override other human and civil rights of people within the jurisdiction of the courts.
As to the seventh factor, the comments in the sixth Kennedy factor understandably advance the
225

position that removal is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.

Kurth Ranch also promotes the writer’s argument. In concluding that the tax for the
226

possession of the marijuana was so exaggerated as to constitute punishment,

the Court stressed

that the tax was conditioned on the commission of a crime and was imposed only after the taxpayer
had been arrested, thus limiting its application to a person charged with a crime. In the removal
provision of the 1996 Immigration Acts, these factors exist as well. The alien has been convicted of
225

See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963).
See generally Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994); contra United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (forfeiture had non-punitive goals, i.e., it encouraged
property owners to avoid the use of their property for illegal purposes, it was not tied to scienter,
and it was imposed in rem, rather than in personam).
226

his qualifying crime. The removal occurs in response to the arrest and the crime. As to the focus of
this article, the removal occurs even though the alien committed his societal wrong before the
sanction was legislatively enacted.
Who could foresee that Congress would supplement the punishment set forth in the penal
codes of the various states by enacting later legislation which would result in the removal and
banishment from their adopted country, not to mention isolation from their families? The benefit of
having a lawyer with a clairvoyant view on the evolution of immigration-related criminal law would
logically assist the accused in deciding whether to intelligently and competently waive his right to a
jury trial in either the state or federal court.

However, justice does not rely on lawyers with

extrasensory tools to assist in its administration. Procedural due process, at a minimum, dictates that
the parties in a criminal setting know what the litigation and constitutional rules are. An accused
cannot possibly act intelligently and competently if the additionally punitive rules are not in place
227

until several years after a conviction is returned on a plea bargain disposition.

Some jurisdictions,

like Texas, require a trial court, before accepting a guilty plea, to inform defendants that a conviction
228

in the absence of US citizenship could result in exclusion, removal or denial of US citizenship.

Others merely state that failure to advise a client of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea
229

does not nullify an otherwise voluntarily and knowingly entered plea.

To allow the removal of resident aliens convicted of so-called aggravated felonies prior to
the effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts violates a principle of justice “so rooted in the
230

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

Does this practice of

changing the rules of procedure and punishment after the fact violate those “fundamental principles
227

See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 468 (1938) (The Court effectively held that an
accused has the right to counsel in all federal criminal trials).
228
See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (a) (4) (1985) (The immigration consequences
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230
See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934).

of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”?

231

This writer

asserts that it does. Of course, the writer concedes that numerous precedents exist against the
232

argument that the removal provisions found in the 1996 Immigration Acts are unconstitutional.

Notwithstanding, the writer urges the Supreme Court and the Congress to correct the abuses created
by the 1996 Immigration Acts so that we as a people can return to the constitutional foundation upon
which the United States built its government and its republic.
The Founding Fathers, reacting to a history of oppressive practices in Great Britain, included
specific wording in the Constitution to protect against past abuses. In declaring that retroactive
legislation would be impermissible, the drafters directed their prohibitions against the Congress and
then the States. These leaders admonished Congress that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
233

shall be passed.”

The drafters then instructed that “No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder,
234

ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . .”

The drafters undoubtedly

contemplated only legislative action when it referred to bills and laws in the Constitution. However,
a persistent question in the evolution of our law is whether such legislation can include punitive civil
matters.

The courts since time immemorial have held that the clause is limited to criminal
235

statutes.

A review of our American common law development leads the writer to conclude that our
unique jurisprudence has room to evolve. Nothing in our early constitutional history should obstruct
the pronouncement of a rule that civil statutes, punitive in nature and/or in application, qualify as

231
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236

bills of attainder and/or ex post facto laws.

On the contrary, rulings by the United States Supreme

Court and other lower courts lend support to the writer’s thesis that the removals resulting from pre237

1996 convictions should undergo constitutional scrutiny.
238

Ironically, Calder v. Bull,

the case primarily cited for the principle that the Ex Post Facto

Clause applies only to criminal cases, addressed a civil dispute. The Calders and the Bulls battled in
a probate court in 1793 while our nation adjusted to liberty and experienced the opportunity to
develop its jurisprudence. The Calders won. The law did not provide for appeal or for a new
hearing in probate court so the legislature of Connecticut in 1795, acting in a judicial capacity,
239

effectively set aside the earlier decree in probate.

The Bulls then prevailed. The Court’s sole

inquiry was whether the resolution or law of the State of Connecticut qualified as an ex post facto
240

law within the prohibition of the United States Constitution.

The Supreme Court answered in the

241

negative.

Justice Chase began his opinion in Calder by stating “The decision of one question
determines (in my opinion) the present dispute. I shall, therefore, state from the record no more to
242

the case, than I think necessary for the consideration of that question only.”
236

The new law or

See Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829) (“The common law of England is not
to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general
principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that
portion which was applicable to their situation.”)
237
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (indigent parents in
civil child termination proceeding can qualify for court-appointed counsel); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juveniles in civil adjudicatory hearings
entitled to rights normally limited to criminal cases); contra, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial as not essential to the development of the
truth).
238
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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Id. at 386-87.
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241
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Id. at 386 (emphasis in original). The Court, promising to state no more than essential,
nevertheless proceeded to engage in an extensive pronouncement on the criminal aspects of the
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, alleged dictum later criticized by Justice Johnson in

procedure no doubt adversely affected the Calders. They lost a right to realty, not to liberty. The
Calder battle perhaps should have been settled on other grounds, but the ex post facto issue surfaced
directly. The Supreme Court addressed the history of bills of attainder, also known as bills of pains
and penalties (bills which addressed lesser punishments) and of ex post facto laws (statutes which
243

involved capital punishments).

A majority and two analytically supportive concurring opinions

consistently adhered to the premise that the history of ex post facto legislation centered on criminal
244

and not on civil laws.

The writer asserts that the 1996 Immigration Acts, albeit civil in context when it discusses
removals, is so intertwined with the criminal convictions of permanent resident aliens that removal
legislation is either punitive on its face or at least quasi-punitive in its application. Consequently, the
constitutional prohibitions involving the Ex Post Facto Clause necessarily apply. Calder, often cited
approvingly by courts denying relief to aliens in removal cases, actually appears to provide the
rationale that the retroactive removal provisions of the 1996 Immigration Acts are unconstitutional.
245

An analysis in support of this statement follows in the discussion of the Stogner decision.

Justice Chase stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not secure a citizen in his private
246

property or contract rights.

However, the Court noted that the purpose of the clause is an

additional bulwark in favor of the personal security of a person who is retrospectively subjected to
punishment by a legislative act, specifically providing that a legislature should not pass a law “after
a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for
247

having done it.”

Justice Chase then stated the four categories of what he considered to be ex post

Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416, 681-87 (1829).
243
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246
Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
247
Id. (emphasis in original). Note the clairvoyance with which Justice Chase distinguished

248

facto laws.

Chase emphasized that these four categories, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust

and oppressive, adding “Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every
249

retrospective law is not an ex post facto law: The former, only, are prohibited.”

To be ex post

facto, the law must create, or aggravate, the crime, or increase the punishment, or change the rules of
250

evidence for the purpose of facilitating a conviction.

Justice Paterson then proceeds to concur and provide further guidance on the ex post facto
issue. He cites the writings of Judge Blackstone as proof that the term unquestionably refers to
crimes and nothing else and follows that with a supportive review of the constitutions of the various
251

states.

Specifically, Justice Paterson declares that the prohibition against the states has to be read

in its entirety, i.e., that no State shall “pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” adding that the framers of the Constitution “understood and
used the words in their known and appropriate signification, as referring to crimes, pains, and
penalties, and no further. The arrangement of the distinct members of this section, necessarily points
252

to this meaning.”
B.

A Historian’s View of the Calder Ruling and the Ex Post Facto Clause
Not all constitutional scholars adhere to Calder’s restrictive interpretation of the Ex Post

between a fact done by a subject and one done by a citizen. The issues the courts encounter today,
as a result of the 1996 Immigration Acts, specifically test this nation’s resolve as to the rights of
legal immigrants who have invested their person, financial standing and families in the United
States of America.
248
Id. at 390 (emphasis in original).
249
Id. at 391 (emphasis in original).
250
Id.
251
Id. at 396-97 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE 6). However, the Court later referred to the ex post facto
prohibition against States as applying to civil as well as to criminal acts. Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138-39
(1810) (the Court discussed the ex post facto issue in the context of a contract involving land ).
252
Calder, 3 U.S. at 397. This position seems to strengthen the argument that criminal defendants
who followed their lawyer’s advice and pled guilty on the belief that the then-existing law and
policy would save them from deportation have a constitutional claim since they relied to their
detriment on prior law.

Facto Clause. Professor Leonard Levy has studied the question surrounding the basis upon which
253

the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted.

Should we read the notes of what occurred at the

Constitutional Convention? Or should we rely on other historical documents and the common law
of England? In his book Levy finds no evidence for grounding the law in original intent, arguing
254

that judicial activism, the continual reinterpretation of the Constitution, is inevitable.

His most

critical observation, insofar as the theme of this article is concerned, centers on the instability of the
255

ruling in Calder v. Bull

when one studies all the viewpoints of the time of the Constitutional

Convention.
The term “original intent” stands for the idea that the Supreme Court, in its interpretation of
256

the Constitution, should adhere to the understanding of it by the Framers,

people such as James

Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, and William Paterson, later a Supreme
Court Justice on the Calder case. Original intent should be followed when it is clear, and the courts
257

should look to it as an interpretive guide.

To that extent, those officials, at all three branches of

government, who interpret the Constitution should be led by the Preamble that begins We the
People, a message that transmits the idea that the government of the United States exists to serve
258

the people.

President Lincoln best stated it when he said that this nation was conceived in liberty
259

and dedicated to the proposition that all people are created equal.

In assessing the meaning of terms in the Constitution, such as ex post facto laws, one can

253
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260

conclude that the most important evidence of original intent is the Constitution itself.

The writer

places himself in the “interpretivist” category since he believes that courts should conform to the text
of the Constitution, to original intent if it is clearly discernible, to principles and purposes derived
261

from the Constitution, to history, and to precedents and conventional rules of construction.
262

original intent is clear, then it can be said that the “plain meaning” approach applies.

If the

The Ex Post

Facto Clause does not require the intervention of the Golden Rule exception, which is based on the
logic that the legislature, or in this case, the Framers, would not have intended an unjust or ridiculous
263

result.

That is because the plain meaning of the Constitution unquestionably bars statutes which

have a retroactive punitive approach. Since there is an obvious difference of opinion among
members of the federal judiciary as to the clarity and meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the writer
seeks to articulate the reasons why the 1996 Immigration Acts violate the Constitution.
The strongest basis for upholding the 1996 Immigration Acts is the “purpose” approach.
This method of interpretation directs the judge to the purpose behind the enactment of the statute.
The idea is that since the purpose of the statute was to eliminate a particular wrong or mischief, the
264

court should interpret the statute to produce the result.

The Congress and the courts refer to the

need to control our borders. One of the 1996 Immigration Acts refers to “antiterrorism” in its title.
One of the first terrorist acts in the United States occurred in 1993 in New York. The second
notorious terrorist act was committed not by an alien but by an American citizen in Oklahoma City
in 1995. The writer agrees that the purpose of the 1996 Immigration Acts, i.e., protecting our nation
by removing criminal aliens, is appropriate. However, the disagreement centers on their conflict
with the Ex Post Facto Clause. Thus, the “purpose” approach does not answer the legislative goals
260
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of those who sought enactment of these Acts.
In interpreting the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the writer prefers
“contextualism,” the process of using the context in which a statute was enacted to give the statute
265

meaning.

The process is merely extended to the Super Legislature, i.e., the Constitutional

Convention, the group that enacted the Ex Post Facto Clause.

By reviewing how the term was

utilized during the time period in which American leaders enacted the Constitution, we will better
appreciate and understand the connotations of the term “ex post facto laws.”
James Madison, considered the Father of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights, rejected
the doctrine that the original intent of those who drafted the Constitution should be accepted as an
266

authoritative guide to its meaning.

The Framers apparently thought the original understanding at
267

the convention did not greatly matter.

Instead, the Framers considered significant things such as

the text of the Constitution, construed in the light of conventional rules of interpretation, the
268

ratification debates, and other contemporary expositions.

Madison also relied on the ordinary
269

rules of the common law applicable when construing a document and the history of the time.

The

one factor that Madison believed predominated in seeking the meaning of the Constitution centered
270

on “the true spirit of liberty.”

This spirit he believed came from the people who ratified the
271

Constitution when acting through their state conventions and not from the framers.

Professor Levy supports the writer’s position, i.e., that the Calder decision is flawed: “The
265
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(1977).
266
ORIGINAL INTENT 1. The fact that Madison discredited original intent might explain why he
did not publish his “Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention” until 1840, fifty-three years after
the Framers finished the draft of the Constitution. Id.
267
Id. at 2. Professor Levy notes that Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist points to “the original
understanding at Philadelphia” as being of prime importance. Id.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 5.
270
Id. at 6.
271
Id. at 17.

three [Justices] agreed that ex post facto laws comprehended criminal cases only and did not apply to
272

civil cases or cases that affect property rights. All three men seem to have been mistaken.”

As

Levy sees the development of the Calder opinion, the issue centered on whether legislation that
273

operated retroactively against one’s civil interest encroached on the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Justice

William Paterson, a member of the Constitutional Convention, authored one of the opinions. Justice
Paterson made no reference to his recollections of the debates on the Ex Post Facto Clause. Instead,
he engaged in an effort to construe the term ex post facto by the location of the Ex Post Facto Clause
in Article I, section 10. Section 10 included some prohibitions, civil in nature, in a section ending
with a semicolon. Justice Paterson concluded that the Ex Post Facto Clause included only criminal
matters in that the Clause was found after the semicolon where other prohibitions barred state bills
of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and the granting of any
274

title of nobility.

In support of his position, Levy states:

Contrary to Paterson, “the arrangement of the distinct members of this
section” does not “necessarily” prove that “the framers of the
Constitution . . . understood and used the words . . . as referring to
crimes, pains, and penalties. . . .” The placement of the clause against
titles of nobility shows that Paterson was wrong. Moreover, the ex
post facto clause appears in a list of prohibitions only one of which,
bills of attainder, is criminal in character. Indeed, the clause sits
between the bill of attainder clause and the contract clause, suggesting
that ex post facto laws can involve crimes such as bills of attainder
275
and civil matters such as contracts.
Professor Levy also notes that The Federalist and Sir William Blackstone’s writings,
276

previously referred to, assisted the Court in the Calder outcome.
272

However, Levy notes that

Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
274
Id.
275
Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 397 (1798)) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
276
ORIGINAL INTENT 67.
273

Justice Chase, the lead author in Calder, failed to quote The Federalist # 84 where Alexander
Hamilton had merely called ex post facto laws “formidable instruments of tyranny,” because they
created enemies “after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to
277

punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law. . . .”

Levy asserts

that neither Hamilton nor Blackstone ever suggest that ex post facto laws did not concern civil
278

matters or that they concerned criminal matters only.

The ratifying conventions of the various states provide interesting views on this topic,
particularly since the comments made by the leaders of the various states provide guidance as to the
meaning of the Clause. The Calder opinion referred to four state constitutions for the definition of
the term ex post facto. Two referred to criminal matters; the other two did not use the term, but they
279

referred to oppression from laws that punished actions not criminal when made.

Pennsylvania

and South Carolina added an ex post facto clause to their Constitutions. The drafters apparently took
their ex post facto language from the United States Constitution “without in any way referring to
280

criminal matters.”

The 1784 New Hampshire provision proves even more explicit that the term

ex post facto encompasses civil matters: “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and
unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the
281

punishment of offences.”

The North Carolina ratification debates in 1788 also confirm the civil nature of ex post facto
laws. James Iredell, who later became one of the justices in the Calder majority, debated the
possible ex post facto impact on the state’s currency laws. Timothy Bloodworth argued against
ratification because the Constitution banned state laws allowing payment in paper money for debts.
Bloodworth feared the ban might be applied ex post facto. Another debater, Stephen Cabarrus,
277

Id.
Id.; but see Calder, 3 U.S. at 396-97 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE 6).
279
ORIGINAL INTENT 68.
280
Id. (footnote omitted).
281
Id. (footnote omitted).
278

stated the state’s currency laws would survive since the Constitution prohibited ex post facto
282

legislation by Congress.

“Iredell, answering Bloodworth, agreed with Cabarrus by revealing his

understanding that ex post facto laws extended to civil matters,” specifically declaring that an
283

express clause “provides that there shall be no ex post facto law.”

Justice Iredell was not alone in

contradicting himself once he became a Supreme Court Justice. As a circuit judge, in 1795, Judge
William Paterson instructed a federal jury that the Constitution’s prohibition of state ex post facto
284

laws extended to statutes disturbing land titles.

Madison’s Notes on the Convention also support the flexible interpretation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause to include non-criminal matters. In one instance, Rufus King of Massachusetts urged a
contract clause to limit state power to violate private contracts. After an objection, James Wilson of
Pennsylvania replied: “The answer to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to
285

be prohibited.”

According to Levy, since the debate centered on contract rights, Wilson’s remark
286

indicated that ex post facto laws extended to civil, non-criminal matters.

Madison inquired if that

protection already existed: “Is that not already done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws, which
287

will oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null & void.”

Professor Levy cites several other historical examples of the common understanding of ex
288

post facto laws,

but one specific example serves to conclude with the argument that Calder needs

to be either overruled or modified. Two leading American heroes, George Mason and Patrick
282

Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
284
Id. After the Calder opinion, Congress debated the bankruptcy act, a purely civil matter.
Opponents described the act as a prohibited ex post facto law. The proponents declared it was not
an ex post facto law. “No one in the debates of 1799-1800 or 1803 stated the ex post facto laws
did not apply to civil matters; and no one cited Calder.” Id. Yet today we cite it almost as a
conditioned response that the Ex Post Facto Clause is limited to criminal cases.
285
ORIGINAL INTENT 70.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 71.
288
See id. at 65-74; see also id. at 126-28; 151-52; 413 n.76.
283

Henry, speaking against ratification during the Virginia ratifying convention, “opposed the ban on ex
289

post facto laws precisely because those laws extended to civil matters.”

However, an opponent of

theirs, Edmund Pendleton, a ratificationist who presided over the Virginia ratifying convention, four
years later declared in a judicial opinion that ex post facto laws “destroy rights already acquired
under the former statute, by one made subsequent to the time when they were vested,” clearly
indicating that Pendleton and his judicial brethren believed that ex post facto laws comprehended
290

civil matters.

Whether one looks to the original intent of the Framers, such as Madison, or the plain
meaning, to principles and purposes derived from the Constitution, to history, and to precedents and
conventional rules of construction, the final product should be the same. Calder went too far in its
declaration that the Ex Post Facto Clause includes only criminal cases. The limited ruling is not
supported by any of the methods of analysis traditionally utilized by jurists. Professor Levy
concludes his attack on Calder by stating:

“The Court in [Calder] reinvented the law on the

subject. In doing so the Court did not rely on original intent, and when it reconfirmed the basic
doctrine of Calder in 1854 and claimed to be relying on original intent, it rested exclusively on
291

Dickinson s remark; having found what it sought the Court ignored all else.”
C.

Post-Calder Supreme Court Decisions Support a Modification
It is the humble opinion of this writer that the Calder principles are correct but only as the

rules apply to criminal cases. The Supreme Court, if faced with the issue in a case involving a
retroactively imposed removal, should modify Calder to apply to quasi-punitive “civil” deportations

289

ORIGINAL INTENT 73.
Id. (quoting Turner v. Turner’s Ex’x, 4 Call. (Va.) 234, 237 (1792)). ORIGINAL INTENT 411.
This decision, preceding Calder by six years, is a prime example of the understanding of the term
ex post facto during the colonial era.
291
ORIGINAL INTENT 74. Levy refers to John Dickinson of Delaware who observed that on
examining Blackstone’s Commentaries, he found that the term ex post facto related to criminal
cases only. Id. at 71.
290

based upon a pre-1996 Immigration Acts conviction. Only then can we return, in part, to the
standards of decency upon which our great nation was born. Contrary to a large number of
precedents that state that deportations are civil in nature and that Calder applies to criminal cases
only, authorities exist to establish that the Ex Post Facto Clauses extend to civil settings.
292

For example, in Fletcher v. Peck

293

and Ogden v. Saunders,

the Court referred to the ex
294

post facto prohibition against States as applying to civil as well as to criminal acts.

Fletcher

involved the ex post facto issue in the context of a contract involving land. Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous court, rationalized that since the estate passed into the hands of a purchaser
for valuable consideration, without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained by either general
principles of law or by the United States Constitution from passing a law whereby the estate could
295

be impaired and rendered null and void.

The Court stated that an ex post facto law may inflict
296

penalties on the person or it may inflict pecuniary penalties that swell the public treasury.

“The

legislature is then prohibited from passing a law by which a man’s estate . . . shall be seized for a
297

crime which was not declared, by some previous law, to render him liable to that punishment.”

In Ogden Justice Johnson initiated his crusade against the ex post facto dictum found in
Calder. “It is true, that some confusion has arisen from an opinion, which seems early, and without
due examination, to have found its way into this Court; that the phrase “ex post facto,” was confined

292

10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138 (1810).
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827).
294
A more modern discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and its application to civil matters
occurred in Hiss v. Hampton, 338 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1972). In the 1950s Alger Hiss was
convicted of perjury in connection with issues dealing with national security. Upon reports that he
would receive his federal pension a few years later, Congress enacted the Hiss Act, a law which
denied him his pension. The House debate included comments that the pension denial would be
penal and not regulatory. Id. at 1153.
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296
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298

to laws affecting criminal acts alone.”

Two years later, Justice Johnson made his last effort to
299

correct his perceived wrongs of Calder. In Satterlee v. Mathewson,

he repeated his concerns with

the “unhappy idea” that the phrase ex post facto would be limited to criminal cases only, “a decision
300

which leaves a large class of arbitrary legislative acts without the prohibitions of the constitution.”

He went even further by appending to the Satterlee opinion a note on the exposition of the phrase
301

“ex post facto” in the Constitution.

First, Calder could have been decided on more narrow

grounds without having to expound on the ex post facto issue; the acts of the Connecticut legislature
amounted to the exercise of judicial, not legislative, authority, and thus, by definition, not reachable
302

under the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Second, the adjudication in Calder amounted to obiter dictum
303

since the law or act complained of had nothing to do with criminal law.

Extending the appropriate courtesies to his learned brethren in Calder, Justice Johnson
proceeds to establish that they have not proved that the term ex post facto is limited to criminal
304

cases.

To best prove that civil cases came within the ex post facto concept, he refers to a

precedent from the year 1720, involving a contract and a later enacted statute. The court there
stated: “This act being ex post facto, the construction of the words ought not to be strained, in order
to defeat a contract, to the benefit whereof the party was well entitled, at the time the contract was
305

made.”

Three points support Justice Johnson’s position: First, the courts used the term ex post

facto “in a sense equally applicable to contracts and to crimes; second, the courts applied it to
298

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827).
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829).
300
Id. at 416. Justice Johnson prepared an appendix to this opinion in which he sets forth a
linguistic and legal history of the term ex post facto. See 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 681-87.
301
Id. at 681-87.
302
Id. at 682. The Connecticut legislature historically engaged in judicial activities such as
granting new trials. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798).
303
Id. at 683 (“An opinion given in court, if not necessary to the judgment given of record, is . . .
no judicial opinion at all, and consequently no precedent. . . .”).
304
Id.
305
Id. at 684 (quoting Wilkinson v. Meyer, 2 Lord Raym. 1350-52).
299

statutes affecting contracts; and third, as late as the time of Lord Raymond, the term had not received
306

a practical or technical construction which restricted it to criminal cases.”

If the Ex Post Facto

Clause applies to assets, as Fletcher discusses, then it undoubtedly should apply to the liberty of a
permanent resident alien who has been additionally punished by removal for a previously committed
crime.
When Wooddeson, a noted scholar, wrote about the subject, he referred to “all penal statutes
307

passed ex post facto.”

Johnson questions “but why say penal statutes, and not simply statutes
308

passed ex post facto, if the use of the phrase was exclusively limited to penal statutes.”

Additionally, he cites other sources that state “if a contract be not in its inception usurious, no matter
309

ex post facto shall make it so.”

In a final rebuttal to the Calder jurists, Justice Johnson notes:

But with all deference, I must contend that if any thing is to be deduced from the
arrangement of the three instances of restriction, the argument will be against [Justice
Paterson]. For by placing “ex post facto laws” between bills of attainder, which are
exclusively criminal, and laws violating the obligation of contracts which are
exclusively civil, it would rather seem that ex post facto laws partook of both
310
characters, was common to both purposes.
Simply stated, “the case of Calder vs. Bull cannot claim the pre-eminence of an adjudged case upon
311

this point, and if adjudged was certainly not sustained by reason of authorities.”

Subsequent

312

Supreme Court opinions nonetheless adhere to the Calder dictum.

Not all was lost in the effort to broaden the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In
313

Cummings v. Missouri,
306

the Court addressed a question regarding the state’s practice in its post-
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Id.
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Id. (emphasis in original).
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Id. at 686 (quoting 1 SHEPPARD’S TOUCHSTONE 63) (emphasis in original).
310
Id. at 687.
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E.g., Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463-64 (1854).
313
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 278-79, 317 (1866).
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bellum constitution of restricting the civil rights of individuals who had previously engaged in armed
hostility to the United States, particularly requiring priests and clergymen to take and subscribe an
314

oath that they had not committed certain designated acts. In a companion case, Ex parte Garland,

the Court voided an 1865 act of Congress which provided that no person shall be admitted as an
attorney and counselor to the bar of the Supreme Court and to the bars of any other circuit or district
courts of the United States unless he shall have first taken and subscribed the oath that he has never
voluntarily borne arms against the United States. The Court ruled that such oaths respectively
315

imposed punishments.

The Court in Cummings criticizes the counsel for the state of Missouri for minimizing the
scope of the term “punishment” by limiting it to only a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The
majority opinion states:
The disabilities created by the constitution of Missouri must be regarded as
penalties--they constitute punishment. . . .The learned counsel . . . does not
include under liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as well as
restraints on the person. He does not include under such property those
estates which one may acquire in professions. . . . The deprivation of any
rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment. . . .
Disqualification from office may be punishment, as in cases of conviction
316
upon impeachment.
The Court further cites Blackstone who claims that some punishments consist of “exile or
banishment, by abjuration of the realm or transportation; others in loss of liberty by perpetual or
317

temporary imprisonment.”

If Blackstone is good authority for the alleged claim that ex post facto

laws relate only to criminal matters, with which the writer vehemently disagrees, then there should
314

Id. at 333, 347.
Id. at 320, 333, 347.
316
Id. at 320 (emphasis added) (compare this disqualification from office to a disqualification from
continued residence in or removal from the United States on the basis of conviction for an alleged
aggravated felony).
317
Id. at 321.
315

be no quarrel with Blackstone’s claim that exile and banishment, i.e., removal, constitute
punishment. If so, then the writer’s position that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to deportations
and removals, modern-day exiles and banishments, should be accepted without further debate.
The language involving bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, according to Chief Justice
Marshall, contains perhaps the closest protection in the nature of a bill of rights for the people of the
318

various states.

The Court in Cummings discusses the little-known concept of a bill of attainder,
319

describing it as a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.

In those cases the

legislative body exercises the powers and office of a judge by pronouncing upon the guilt of the
party, without any of the safeguards of a trial; it determines the sufficiency of the required proof; and
320

it fixes the punishment in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offense.

One

specific historical example of a bill of attainder involves the Earl of Clarendon. A bill entered
against the earl provided that he should suffer perpetual exile, i.e., forever banished, from the
321

realm.

318

See id. at 325. The Constitutional Convention adopted the Constitution in Philadelphia in
September 1787 and ratified it on July 2, 1788. The section known today as The Bill of Rights,
amendments one through ten, was ratified in December 1791. CENTER FOR CIVIC EDUCATION,
AMERICAN LEGACY: THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 12, 27-28 (1998).
319
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866) (compare the bill of attainder definition to the statutory
provisions of the 1996 Immigration Acts that call for removal of any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time, whether before, on, or after the effective date of the law). The
dissenting opinion in Ex parte Garland limits bills of attainder to those which involve a capitally
condemned person whose inheritance suffered the stain or corruption of blood. See Cummings, 71
U.S. at 333, 387.
320
Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323. The Court further quotes Justice Story in his Commentaries, §
1344, who explains that bills of attainder are generally enacted in times of “violent political
excitements,” trampling the rights and liberties of others. Id. (compare the post-war actions in
Cummings and Ex parte Garland to the atmosphere after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
and the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building as they contributed to the 1996
anti-terrorist legislative emotional intensity on Capitol Hill and now the aftermath of the Twin
Tower Tragedy).
321
Cummings, 71 U.S. at 324 (if the earl were to be found in England or any of the king’s
dominions after the first of February 1667, he should suffer the pains and penalties of treason).

In Cummings, the Court concludes that the actions of the state legislature took aim at past,
322

not future, acts that did not define any crimes or declare that any punishment shall be inflicted.

However, the state provisions were intended to deprive such persons of the right to hold certain
323

offices and trusts, and to pursue their ordinary and regular avocations.

In its final holding, the

Court stated:
This deprivation is punishment; nor is it any less so because a
way is opened for escape from it by the expurgatory oath. . . .To make
the enjoyment of a right dependent upon an impossible condition is
equivalent to an absolute denial of the right under any condition, and
such denial, enforced for a past act, is nothing less than punishment
324
imposed for the act.
VIII. Stogner v. California: The Death Knell for Punitive Deportations?
A.

Stogner: The Supreme Court Re-Visits the Ex Post Facto Clause
325

In Stogner v. California

the United States Supreme Court encountered a sensitive issue,

i.e., adjudication of the constitutional rights of an accused child molester. Justice Breyer, writing for
the majority, concluded that a California statute enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had
expired and which resurrected otherwise time-barred criminal prosecutions violated the
326

Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.

California allowed prosecution for sex-related child abuse if

the prosecution began within one year of a victim's report to police. A subsequent provision
clarified that this law revived causes of action barred by prior limitations statutes. In 1998 Stogner
was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. At the time those
322

Id. at 327.
Id.
324
Id. (emphasis added).
325
539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003). Justice Breyer was joined in the majority opinion by
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens. Id. at 2448.
323

crimes were allegedly committed, the limitations period was three years. The Court held that the new
California statute of limitations law produces the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids.
First, the law threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, since the Clause bars
327

governments from enacting statutes with “manifestly unjust and oppressive” retroactive effects.

Second, the law falls literally within the categorical descriptions of ex post facto laws that Justice
Chase set forth authoritatively more than 200 years ago in Calder. It falls within the second
category, which Justice Chase understood to include a new law that inflicts punishments where the
328

party was not, by law, liable to any punishment.

Justice Breyer described the impact of the changes in the statute of limitations by saying the
329

government has refused “to play by its own rules”
330

warning”

and has deprived the defendant of the “fair

that might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence. Allowing legislatures to

decide when to enact retroactive laws, he added, risks both “arbitrary and potentially vindictive
331

legislation” and erosion of the separation of powers.

Drawing substantially on Richard

Wooddeson's 18th-century commentary on the nature of ex post facto laws, the majority recounts the
four factors that Justice Chase enumerated in Calder:

326

Id. at 2448, 2449.
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328
Id. at 2450-51; see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990).
329
Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2450 (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000)).
330
Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)).
331
Id., quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38
(1810) (viewing the Ex Post Facto Clause as a protection against “violent acts which might grow
out of the feelings of the moment”).
327

I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words
and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when
done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these,
332
and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.
The Court found the second category--including any “law that aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed”--describes California’s statute as long as those words are
understood as Justice Chase understood them, i.e., as referring to a statute that “inflicts punishments,
333

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment.”

After all, the statute of limitations had

expired. Justice Breyer further found historical support in the writings of R. Wooddeson who
discusses the ex post facto status of a law that affects punishment by “making therein some
334

innovation, or creating some forfeiture or disability, not incurred in the ordinary course of law.”

He cites as an example of such a law the Acts of Parliament that banished certain individuals
accused of treason, a fact significant because Parliament had enacted those laws not only after the
crime’s commission but also under circumstances where banishment “was simply not a form of
335

penalty that could be imposed by the courts.”

332

Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2450 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 390-91 (emphasis added to
portion relevant to application to the 1996 Immigration Acts).
333
Id.
334
Id. at 2451 (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 R. WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 638 (1792).
335
Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2451.

The majority opinion takes the offensive against the dissent, accusing them of undertaking a
Herculean effort to prove that it is not unfair, in any constitutionally relevant sense, to prosecute a
man for crimes committed twenty-five to forty-two years earlier when nearly a generation has passed
336

since the law granted him an effective amnesty.

According to the majority, the dissent interprets

Justice Chase’s historical examples to show that Calder’s second category concerns only laws that
both (1) subject the offender to increased punishment and (2) do so by changing the nature of an
337

offense to make it greater than it was at the time of commission.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent, says it is a fallacy to apply the label “unfair and
338

dishonest” to the statute, even though the law revives long-dead prosecutions.

A law that does not

alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime “greater than it
was, when committed.” He further argued that until Stogner, a plea in bar had not been thought to
339

form any part of the definition of an offense.

The dissent additionally asserts that the reach of the

Ex Post Facto Clause is strictly limited to the precise formulation of the Calder categories. The first
three categories guard against the common problem of retroactive redefinition of conduct by
criminalizing it (category one), enhancing its criminal character (category two), or increasing the
340

applicable punishment (category three).

Citing from Calder, Justice Kennedy repeats: “The

enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a
341

crime or penalty; and therefore they may be classed together.”

336

Id. at 2455.
Id.
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See id. at 2463. Justice Kennedy was joined in the dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 2461.
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See id. at 2464.
340
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Id. at 2465 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 397).
337

The dissent noted that it was an accepted procedure in 17th-century England for Parliament
to pass laws imposing banishment. In order to counter the majority, the dissent discussed the
examples of Clarendon and Bishop Francis Atterbury, who, in the midst of hysteria over both real
and supposed plots, was accused of conspiracy to depose George I. The evidence against Atterbury
was meager, and supporters of the Crown, fearing neither the common-law courts nor even the
House of Lords would convict, introduced a bill of banishment, declaring Atterbury a traitor and
342

subjecting him to a range of punishments not previously imposed, including exile and civil death.

The Duke of Wharton, who registered the lengthiest dissent, commented that “[Atterbury’s] Bill
seems as irregular in the punishments it inflicts, as it is in its foundation, and carries with it an
unnatural degree of hardship,” adding that the sanction against Clarendon, although more mild, was
343

just as violative of the rule against penalties imposed after the fact.

According to the dissent,

these illustrative examples suggest the second Calder category encompasses only the laws that, to the
detriment of the defendant, change the character of the offense to make it greater than it was at the
344

time of commission.

342

Id. at 2468, citing G. BENNETT, TORY CRISIS IN CHURCH AND STATE, 1688-1730, at 258-65
(1975); BISHOP ATTERBURY’S TRIAL, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 640, 644-46 (1723) (reprint 2000).
343
Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2469.
344
Id. (emphasis added). Based on his perspectives as a former trial judge in criminal matters, the
writer agrees with the dissent on the need to consider the age and other characteristics of the
victims in the enactment of an appropriate statute of limitations. However, such factors cannot
justify the dissent’s abandonment of constitutional protections against Ex Post Facto legislation.

Justice Kennedy approvingly states that the link between these three categories was noted by
Justice Paterson in Calder: “The enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within the same
345

mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and therefore they may be classed together.”

Finally, the dissent cites an expert’s treatise on the Ex Post Facto Clause, stating that the category of
retroactive legislation covered:
[T]he law which undertakes to aggravate a past offence, and
make it greater than when committed, endeavors to bring it under
some description of transgression against which heavier penalties or
more severe punishments have been denounced: as, changing the
character of an act which, when committed, was a misdemeanor, to a
crime; or, declaring a previously committed offence, of one of the
classes graduated, and designated by the number of its degree, to be
346
of a higher degree than it was when committed.

The federal law, seen as supreme in matters involving immigration matters, clearly impacted state
misdemeanors by graduating them to “a higher degree than it was when committed.” Stated another
way, Congress converted scores of state misdemeanors across the nation into “aggravated felonies”
and, even worse, increased the punishment by adding removal, modern-day banishment, as a further
consequence of the conviction. The federal courts should thus apply the Stogner ex post facto
interpretation and void punitive removals that are based on retroactive criminal convictions.
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Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 397).
Id. at 2464 (quoting WILLIAM WADE, OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RETROACTIVE
LAWS § 273, at 317-18 (1880)).
346

Stogner is not the only shining light that the Supreme Court has emitted in potential efforts to
undo injustices created by the 1996 Immigration Acts. Earlier in the same term the Court decided
347

Smith v. Doe,

a case challenging a sex offender registration act as an unconstitutional ex post facto

law. The Alaska statute at issue in Smith v. Doe required any sex offender or child kidnapper to
register either with a prison system, if they are incarcerated, or with local law enforcement if the
348

individual is at liberty. Both the registration and the notification system are retroactive.

The law

mandated registration for 15 years if convicted only once and for life if convicted of an aggravated
349

sex offense or of two or more sex offenses.

The respondents in Smith v. Doe were each convicted

of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor and were each released in 1990 from prison. John Doe I and
John Doe II claimed that the even if the legislature intended the act to be a non-punitive, civil
regulatory scheme, as applied to them it constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post
350

Facto Clause.

The Court held that the Alaska statute established a civil regulatory scheme, one
351

whose retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

347

538 U.S. 84 (2003).
Id. at 90.
349
Id.
350
See id. at 91-92.
351
Id. at 105-06.
348

In considering whether a law constitutes retroactive punishment, the Court must first
352

“ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”

If the

intention of the legislature, or the Congress in the case of the 1996 Immigration Acts, was to impose
punishment, that ends the inquiry.

On the other hand, if the intention was to enact a regulatory

scheme that is civil and non-punitive, the inquiry proceeds to examine whether the statutory scheme
is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the Government’s intention to have a purely
353

civil system.

Even if the statute’s objective is consistent with the purposes of the Alaska criminal

justice system, Alaska’s regulatory scheme, i.e., registration and notification, does not make the
354

objective punitive.

Further, where a legislative act is related to the state’s power to protect the

health and safety of its citizens, it will be considered regulatory and not a purpose to add to the
355

punishment.
B.

The Punitive Aspects of the Aggravated Felony Legislation
One only need look objectively at the 1996 Immigration Acts to conclude that Congress

intended the enactment of punitive legislation. Legislative history might be helpful but hardly
essential to establish intent where Congress so blatantly set out to create a new scheme to fight
356

terrorism and the infiltration of aliens into American society.

Congress first utilized the
357

“aggravated felony” concept in the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

Congress next

addressed the term in the 1996 enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
358

1996

359

(AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

What better proof of intent to enact punitive laws than by the title of the two more recent pieces of
legislation.
352

Id. at 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
Id.; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
354
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 94.
355
Id. at 93-94 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960)).
356
A Harvard University professor, Samuel P. Huntington, documents some of our nation’s
xenophobic concerns in an excerpt from his book WHO WE ARE in which he discusses an alleged
353

In addition to the obvious intent, the 1996 Immigration Acts further concentrated on a new
penalty classification scheme with removal consequences.

The Acts further defined the term

“aggravated felony,” which, for example, now includes convictions for theft or burglary if the alien
360

receives a term of imprisonment of at least a year.

The amendment further includes convictions
361

for fraud and deceit where the victim lost over $10,000.

The congressional intent was so punitive

that on September 30, 1996, the effective date of the second Immigration Act, a resident alien’s pre362

1996 conviction legislatively transformed from a misdemeanor into an “aggravated felony.”
363

Congress also expanded the term aggravated felony to include any “crime of violence”

resulting in

364

a prison sentence of at least one year.

Hispanic challenge. Huntington warns of the need for immigrants of Mexican descent to become
Americanized and of the fears that these immigrants from Mexico and Latin America will make
the United States a divided bilingual, bicultural nation. John Hall, Noted professor sounds the
alarm on immigration, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, March 7, 2004 (page unknown), available at
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=67ddf96e9574b219da690f2d62d76a2d&docn
357
102 Stat. 4469-70 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2000).
358
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
359
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-46 (1996).
360
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
361
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (M)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
362
Maynard, supra note 3, at 29; INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000). Appellate courts have
held that misdemeanor shoplifting convictions with a one-year suspended sentence or potential
sentence amount to aggravated felonies. E.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2d
rd
Cir. 2000); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 791-92 (3 Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845
(1999).
363
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994 ed., Supp. V); INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000).
364
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.). Apparently, an
actually served sentence of 364 days in jail custody does not meet the one-year requirement. See
Maynard 28. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 16 (a), (b) (2000). The question whether a drunk
driving case that results in injury constitutes a crime of violence should be answered by the
th
Supreme Court within the year. See Leocal v. Ashcroft (unpublished) (11 Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, --U.S.--, 124 S. Ct. 1405 (2004); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (h) (3) (injury resulting to
another from driving while intoxicated constitutes a “serious criminal offense”).

A further view of Smith v. Doe corroborates the writer’s argument that the 1996 Immigration
Acts qualify as strictly punitive statutes for Ex Post Facto Clause analysis. The Court discusses the
fact that a state that seeks to punish an individual will likely select a means that is traditionally
considered punitive, proceeding to conclude that sex offender registration and notification statutes
365

do not meet that punitive level.

The sex offenders in Smith v. Doe argued that they were being

subjected to shaming punishments of the colonial period, but the Court concluded that the state does
not make the publicity and the resulting stigma “an integral part of the objective of the regulatory
366

scheme.”

365
366

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
Id. at 97, 99.

Of particular interest is the Court’s treatment of the history of other colonial era
punishments. The Court recognized that certain colonial practices were designed to make these
367

offenders suffer “permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the community.”

The

Court continued, “The most serious offenders were banished, after which they could neither return to
368

their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one.”

In

addition to the dissemination of information to society in early punitive practices, the Court noted
that banishment particularly carried more than the normal: It meant expulsion from the
369

community.

In upholding Alaska’s statutory scheme, the Court observed: “In contrast to the

colonial shaming punishments, however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting
370

stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.”

On the other hand, Congress, in

passing the 1996 Immigration Acts, acted to make removal, a euphemistically-labeled banishment,
“an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.” In doing this, Congress created a
punitive system that must overcome ex post facto and due process of law challenges.

367

Id. at 98 (quoting Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1913 (1991)).
368
Id. (quoting T. BLOMBERG & K. LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF CONTROL
30-31 (2000)).
369
Id.
370
Id. at 99.

C.

Application of Stogner to the Removal Aspects of the 1996 Legislation
Justice Breyer described the impact of the changes in the statute of limitations by saying the
371

government has refused “to play by its own rules”
372

warning”

and has deprived the defendant of the “fair

that might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence.

Allowing legislatures to

decide when to enact retroactive laws, he added, risks both “arbitrary and potentially vindictive
373

legislation” and erosion of the separation of powers.

Similarly, the 1996 Immigration Acts place

the resident alien in the predicament of making knowing, voluntary and intelligent decisions on
whether or not to waive valuable constitutional rights in a vacuum. Making a decision on whether or
not to abandon a right to a jury trial, or to contest questionably-obtained evidence, is sufficiently
troubling. Now the Congress and the courts in incredibly large numbers are requiring removals of
aliens who waived rights to contest the quantum of evidence and the legality of searches in the
honest and legitimate, at the time, belief that the offense was not a deportable offense.
Justice Breyer refers to the ex post facto status of a law that affects punishment by “making
therein some innovation, or creating some forfeiture or disability, not incurred in the ordinary
374

course of law.”

The ordinary course of the criminal law in 1980, for example, was whatever the

penal statute provided as punishment.

Adding removal, modern-day banishment, to the

consequences of a criminal conviction more than a decade after the finality of the conviction clearly
constitutes a forfeiture or disability not incurred in the regular course of the law.

371

539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2450 (2003) (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533
(2000)).
372
Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)).
373
Id. (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137138 (1810) (The Ex Post Facto Clause seen as a protection against “violent acts which might grow
out of the feelings of the moment”).
374
Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2451 (quoting 2 R. WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL
VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 638 (1792)) (emphasis from original opinion).

The writer’s thesis, that deportations for criminal conduct engaged in at any time before the
effective date of the new statute, in this case the 1996 Immigration Acts, violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause, is supported by both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Stogner. For instance, both
opinions refer to the historical practice of banishment as punishment. Can one really dispute that
banishment is deportation, exile, removal? The writer does not seek to bar all removals; instead, the
writer seeks to restrict the power of Congress from retroactively imposing removals for criminal
convictions finalized prior to the effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts and as to additional
retroactive efforts in future legislation. Further support for the writer’s position surfaces in the
following passage of the majority opinion:
In sum, Clarendon's case involved Parliament’s punishment of an individual
who was charged before Parliament with treason and satisfactorily proven to have
committed treason, but whom Parliament punished by imposing “banishment” in
circumstances where the party was not, in “the ordinary course of law,” liable to any
“banishment” . . . To repeat, the example of Clarendon’s banishment is an example
of an individual’s being punished through legislation that subjected him to
punishment otherwise unavailable, to any degree, through “the ordinary course of
375
law. . . .”

375

Id. at 2456; see also Carmell, 529 U.S. at 523, n. 11. With respect to the second category,
Justice Chase provided two examples: the banishments of Lord Clarendon in 1667 and of Bishop
Francis Atterbury in 1723. Id. at 2467. Banishment is acknowledged as a punishment. id.; see
also, Craies, Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L.Q. REV. 388, 392 (1890) (Both
perpetual and temporary banishment were well known to the common law) (Cited by Justice
Kennedy in his dissent, Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2467 ).

D.

A Historical Precedence for Ex Post Facto Assessment of a Civil Statute
376

In Hiss v. Hampton

a federal employee named Alger Hiss accumulated fifteen years of

federal employment service between 1929 and 1947. Hiss was convicted in 1950 of perjury before a
377

Federal grand jury and sentenced to five years.

When he reached the age of 62 in 1966, he became

eligible for a federal monthly annuity. In 1967 Hiss filed a claim for his annuity. The Civil Service
378

Commission rejected his application pursuant to section 1 (a) (3) (B) of Public Law 87-299.

That

section, retroactively applied to Hiss, provided:
(a)

An individual . . . may not be paid annuity or retired pay . . . if the individual--

(1)

was convicted, before, on, or after September 1, 1954 of . . .

(b)

. . . (3) Perjury committed under the statutes of the United States or the District of
Columbia”

(B)

in testifying before a Federal grand jury . . . in connection with a matter involving or
relating to an interference with or endangerment of . . . the national security or
379

defense of the United States.

376

338 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id. at 1144.
378
Id. at 1143. The statute is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8312 (1996).
379
338 F. Supp. at 1144 (emphasis added).
377

The district court faced the issue whether the imposed disabilities were effectively punitive
even though the denial of the pension was based upon a civil statute. The court stated that the
disabilities imposed by the statute could not be applied to Hiss because of the Ex Post Facto
380

Clause.

The court appears to center its decision on the fact that the civil disability was contingent
381

upon the criminal conviction he suffered in 1950, eleven years before the enactment of the law.

The district court declared that as applied to Hiss and his co-defendant Strasburger, the retroactive
statute “does not regulate, it punishes” since other violent and morally corrupt former federal
382

employees were restored to grace and not denied benefits.
IX.

380

Conclusion

Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1148. The 1996 Immigration Acts repeat this history and base a removal, in part, upon
conviction for an aggravated felony.
382
Id. at 1153.
381

Our American jurisprudence has seen antiquated rulings set aside to make room for our ever383

evolving sense of fairness.

This great nation should not succumb to the concerns expressed by the

patriot Thomas Paine who stated: “A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial
384

appearance of being right.”

In addition, we should always ask ourselves, regardless of our

partisan politics, the words of Robert F. Kennedy, the words with which this article began. We
should not just complain about injustices we see around us. We should utilize our God-given
intellectual powers and debate issues that concern America and possibly attain a resolution.
Specifically, we may never find an adequate answer to the human suffering that results from the
migration of undocumented workers. However, we should address the issues regarding when, how
and why a United States permanent resident alien has to vacate his American home other than just
by the issuance of an absolute legislative edict. Where is the third branch of government in this
process? Two hundred years ago, Chief Justice John Marshall delivered his decision in Marbury v.
Madison. As enunciated in Marbury, the third branch has to revive its historical mission of tackling
385

those statutes that are repugnant to the Constitution.

383

E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and
its exclusionary rule limitations.
384
Guy N. Harrison, Who Guarantees These Rights?, 65 TEX. B.J. 794 (2002).
385
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).

As a nation the United States necessarily accepted undocumented immigrant labor, primarily
Latinos from Mexico. Enticed by the opportunities, Latinos and others have continued to migrate,
both legally and illegally. The fact that a number of immigrants have violated the law during their
United States residence does not justify this nation’s policy, as reflected in the 1996 Immigration
Acts, of disregarding the Constitution and curtailing rights of resident aliens by retroactively
punishing them for criminal convictions obtained years before 1996.

Without question, the

Constitution places in the Congress ultimate control over immigration issues.

However, the

Constitution places in the three branches of government the duty to respect the overall spirit of our
fundamental document and to accord due process protections to all, even to those who are not yet
citizens of the United States. The Founding Fathers essentially sent this message when they avoided
any mention of “citizens” in promulgating the Bill of Rights, and Congress continued this
constitutional doctrine in distinguishing between rights of citizens and the rights of all persons in
386

drafting later amendments.

In conclusion, the writer urges the United States Supreme Court to extend the Ex Post Facto
Clause to quasi-punitive deportation proceedings, i.e., those in which the removal order resulted
from a pre-1996 conviction. Our Constitution has developed over the years into a document that
flexibly adjusts to the changing times. The thousands of American residents who face removal or
have been removed from their adopted country and from their families for conduct preceding the
1996 Act should receive relief. Those who have already suffered separation from their home and
family should be re-evaluated for return to the United States.

386

E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (involving the rights of citizens to vote).

The writer hopes he has shown and explained how retroactive statutes, albeit partially civil in
nature, can have such punitive consequences that they should be constitutionally prohibited. The
1996 IIRIRA legislation represents one of those statutes that, in specific circumstances, has not only
a retroactive reach but also a punitive impact. The writer further contends that removal, when
conditioned upon a prior conviction, results in a loss of liberty that triggers not only due process
protections but also ex post facto prohibitions.
The 1996 Immigration Acts must be amended. Cases that reach the courts must be accorded
a constitutional rule consistent with American and constitutional history. Judicial precedents have
been reversed in the past. Judicial precedents will be reversed in the future. The amelioration of
immense suffering in families throughout America will result once this part of our history will be
corrected and the regressive and punitive impact of the 1996 Immigration Acts will be eliminated.
Remembering the words of Anthony Lewis, a prominent columnist for the New York Times, who
called for reform of the 1996 Act, we as a great people need to return to the concepts of American
decency. Proud Americans and the immigrant community petition the nation’s Supreme Court to
cut through the ideological barriers and exercise their power as the third branch of government by
correcting--retroactively--the multitude of wrongs which have occurred since the passage of the
AEDPA and IIRIRA, the 1996 Immigration Acts.

